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
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EGYPT: Cairo Likely Seeks Alliances to Help Deter Regional Threats

Summary: Since mid-February, Cairo took actions to promote political and economic development in multiple African and Asian nations to regain regional influence, support current allies, and develop new ones. Cairo reaffirmed its alliances with Khartoum and Amman. Currently, it continues investing heavily in Kinshasa and Baghdad and re-established diplomatic relations with Doha. These alliances may gain Cairo an advantage when deterring other regional powers like Addis Ababa and Ankara.

Background: Cairo, under the guidance of President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, continues promoting political and economic development throughout Africa and Asia. In Africa, Cairo attempts to reverse the geopolitical changes of the 2011 and 2013 revolutions that left Egypt's status as a regional power in the Horn of Africa and Northern Africa uncertain. On 6 March, el-Sisi visited Sudan for the first time in nearly two years to discuss with Sudanese officials developing closer economic and military ties to counter Addis Ababa's growing regional power. Cairo also aims to strengthen its political ties with Kinshasa through investments in infrastructure, energy, and water projects. In Asia, Cairo seeks to promote and expand trade with Jordan and Iraq via the establishment of a land route connecting the three nations. Throughout the past month, Cairo reached out to Doha to finalize reestablishing diplomatic relations with Qatar, putting an end to its part in the Gulf Division, and move beyond Doha's alleged support for terrorism. Ankara reached out and resumed diplomatic contact with Cairo, and stated it wants further cooperation after years of tension since the 2013 revolution toppled the Turkish backed President Mohammed Morsi.

Political Inroads in Africa: Cairo will likely continue to use economic and military aid to secure allies throughout Africa. Several recent examples of outreach to African nations illustrate the depth and breadth of Cairo's efforts to build its ties across the continent:

- El-Sisi's visit to Khartoum aimed to rebuild ties with its southern neighbor, and both nations signed agreements to strengthen their economy and military cooperation.
- On 11 March, Sudan's Premier Abdalla Hamdok visited Cairo and stated Cairo has a long history of investing in development projects. He also stated that he welcomes the idea of establishing a joint Egyptian-Sudanese council to discuss all issues linking both nations together. El-Sisi and Hamdok both agreed that they are incomplete consensus over the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD), and seek to protect Egyptian and Sudanese water rights.
- At the start of the year, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi was appointed the new chairman of the African Union. In February, Tshisekedi visited Cairo to sign agreements to invest in infrastructure, energy, and water projects throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The two governments signed an agreement to build the Tshipuka solar park in the DRC, which aims to resolve Kasai-Oriental province's electricity problems. Kinshasa also signed with Egyptian companies to build a drinking water plant on the Lubi River in the Sankuru province. These are just the latest developments between Cairo and Kinshasa to boost Cairo's economic and political

influence in the DRC, improve its reputation among the peoples of the DRC, and receive favorable rulings, especially over water rights, in the African Union.

Reintegration in Asia: As regional and water uncertainty weakens Egypt, Cairo will likely seek to reestablish itself as a leader of the Arab world and western Asia. Here, too, recent examples highlight the strong diplomatic push that Cairo has made:

- On 1 March, Egypt’s Minister of Transport Kamel al-Wazir and Jordan’s Ambassador to Egypt Amjad Adaileh met in Cairo to discuss bilateral relations. The two officials also stressed the importance of a protocol signed previously between the two countries and Iraq to operate a land route to transport people and goods between the three nations.
- Both Cairo and Amman are already engaged in development projects in Iraq, with Cairo receiving oil imports in return. Since the end of 2020, the three nations have sought to consolidate mutual cooperation and coordination by achieving Arab integration.
- On 3 March, Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani met with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry in Cairo, in the first meeting since the two nations restored diplomatic relations that officially ended more than three years of Gulf Division. In 2017, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain had severed relations with Qatar and imposed a diplomatic, trade, and travel blockade against Doha over its alleged support for the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist organization; accusations that Doha has repeatedly denied. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry stated that reconciliation will promote solidarity between the nations of the Arab Quartet and strengthen joint Arab action to confront regional challenges.




Figure 1: A map of the Mediterranean Sea including Egyptian, Greek & Turkish exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and Turkey’s contested claims.

- On 12 March, Turkey's presidential spokesman stated "a new chapter can be opened; a new page can be turned" in ties with Cairo. All relations between Cairo and Ankara were

severed when former President Morsi was ousted in a military coup led by current President el-Sisi in 2013. Ankara's backing of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring was central to a largely ideological divide between the two nations. However, Ankara has refused to renounce its support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Ankara paid a high price for alienating Cairo, who last year signed an agreement with Athens to develop new natural gas mines in the Mediterranean Sea; recent energy findings in the Mediterranean have sparked territorial disputes between Athens and Ankara.

Outlook and Implications: Cairo, by continuing to use economic and military aid to secure allies in Africa, will likely improve its regional, political, and military strength. El-Sisi's first visit to Khartoum in nearly two years almost certainly indicates Cairo's concern with ensuring that Khartoum remains capable to stand up to Addis Ababa. The idea of a joint Egyptian-Sudanese council will likely lead to a more cohesive strategy between the two nations to confront Addis Ababa's growing regional power over the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa will likely take a more aggressive approach to deal with Cairo and Khartoum in response to the countries strengthening ties. Cairo's latest investments in the DRC likely indicate that Cairo aims to strengthen political ties with Kinshasa. These investments could provide Egyptian companies an opportunity to reap returns by investing in the DRC, which would subsequently serve Cairo's national economy. Cairo will almost certainly use all of its investments in the DRC to persuade Tshisekedi in the African Union to rule favorably on issues Cairo deems critical to its national security, such as water rights.

As Cairo's geopolitical future in Africa remains uncertain it will likely seek to re-establish its position as a regional power in the Arab world and Western Asia. Cairo will almost certainly use the land trade route to allow Egyptian companies to invest in Iraq, similar to the types of investments in the DRC. Cairo will likely use any oil imports from Baghdad to strengthen their military position against Addis Ababa. The land trade route and the possibility of Arab integration will also likely strengthen the political relationship between Cairo, Baghdad, and Amman, giving Cairo more allies in the Middle East. Cairo may view its part in the Gulf Division as having served its purpose to politically and economically weaken Doha. Cairo may also no longer view Doha as a significant supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore no longer a threat to the current administration. However, it will almost certainly take some time before diplomatic relations between Cairo and Doha reach the pre-2013 level again. Cairo almost certainly views Ankara as a long-term threat because of ideological differences and interference in Cairo during the Arab Spring and under Morsi. Cairo likely views Ankara as having the resources to support terrorist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood within Egyptian borders. Cairo almost certainly signed the natural gas development agreement with Athens to strengthen its energy reserves and secure an ally in the Mediterranean Sea. Cairo likely views Ankara's claims in the Mediterranean as infringing on its EEZ. This could cause diplomatic relations to break off again.

[August Kather]

CHINA: Cyber Espionage Likely to Surpass Rivals as Preeminent Superpower

Summary: The People's Republic of China (PRC) persists in its aggressive policy to conduct cyber espionage and attacks on foreign nations. The PRC-sponsored cyber operations likely aim to improve its military capabilities and aid its commercial companies on the global stage. China most likely intends to surpass global and regional rivals to establish itself as the preeminent global superpower.

Background: China conducts offensive cyber operations with targets primarily in government sectors but also in the commercial technology, engineering, finance, and pharmaceutical industries. Cyber-enabled espionage and attacks target East Asian countries and other rivals in the international community. Several identified Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups conduct cyber operations with intentions to both collect and destroy intellectual property and strategic data to promote Chinese national objectives. Chinese threat actors utilize Remote Access Trojans, social engineering, zero-day vulnerabilities, and other cyber-enabled exploits to collect intelligence and materialize risk within the international cyber domain. President Xi Jinping worked to shift Chinese foreign policy to more hardline and dramatic tactics like Beijing's assertive cyber operations.

Sustained Cyber Espionage: Beijing likely commits its aggressive cyber espionage on foreign states to elicit actionable military intelligence within the international community. On 18 March, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service acknowledged the Chinese APT31 cybergroup as the responsible party for a cyberattack on the Finnish Parliament that compromised email accounts. The PRC-sponsored cybergroup RedDelta similarly targeted the Vatican and Catholic organizations in Hong Kong. According to Recorded Future, the attacks resulted from a planned renewal of an agreement between China and the Vatican and the attacks intended to give Beijing advance intelligence on the negotiating power of the Vatican. Telemetry data suggests that the Beijing-sponsored hacking also targeted major telecommunications companies in Asia and other Western nations. Chinese APT group Mustang Panda carried out Operation Diànxùn, a cyber-espionage campaign to collect data and steal intellectual property pertaining to 5G technology, according to McAfee. Sustained cyber espionage and intelligence gathering conducted by Beijing likely demonstrates its key national strategy to improve military capabilities and establish power in the face of its global rivals.

Economic Motivators: The economically motivated Chinese cyberattacks most likely promote its objective to establish a Chinese commercial monopoly over the international market. The Beijing-sponsored threat actor Hafnium conducted a largescale intrusion on Microsoft Exchange email servers using previously unknown zero-day exploits, resulting in Western nations issuing an emergency directive on 3 March. The PRC-sponsored actors obtained industrial secrets and corporate advantages for Chinese companies to utilize against Microsoft. China similarly has demonstrated economic motivation in regard to the global tech race with investment in Africa. Cyber intrusions and intelligence gathering allow Chinese telecoms like Huawei, ZTE, and Transsion to assert economic control and pressure over the continent. Additionally, the PRC-

funded cybergroup APT10, known as Cicada, has targeted various industries including clothing, conglomerates, engineering, industrial products, and automotive to steal vital trade secrets. This pattern of cyber-enabled intrusions highly likely intends to promote Chinese commercial power as its corporations compete with rivals on the global stage.



Figure 1: Locations of victims of PRC-Sponsored APT10, or Cicadia group, malware attacks.

Outlook and Implications: The use of illegally obtained intelligence likely provides China the means to assert its power on rivals. Chinese-sponsored cyber espionage provides Beijing intelligence with the likely goal of leveraging and influencing behaviors of foreign actors on the global stage. Beijing’s aggressive cyber espionage activities in amassing information of political and military value occurs most likely to reinforce military capabilities in the face of its adversaries. Xi likely intends to project superior military authority and national strength to convince challengers within the international community. The PRC will almost certainly continue its aggressive policies and operations within the cyber domain despite attribution and responses from rivals because of the successful power it projects. Chinese APT groups attack and spy on political targets likely to enact the most possible damage while collecting advantageous actionable intelligence.

By conducting cyberattacks on various corporations within the international economic market, China likely intends to establish its own commercial monopoly in the international scene. China will likely promote its own conglomerates and corporations to the forefront of the global economy to establish itself as the preeminent global superpower. Beijing focused massive resources and efforts on developing its national cyber capabilities, most likely to secure its governmental authority within the country and outside its borders. It appears that China views accumulating economic power through cyber operations as a primary objective to validate its

strategic influence against Western nations and other regional rivals. The PRC's end goal likely involves projecting power beyond its borders and demonstrating its preeminence as the strongest authority within the international community.

[Patrick Komanowski]

RUSSIA: Disinformation Campaign on Vaccines Will Likely Raise COVID-19 Cases

Summary: Russia's intelligence agencies continued attempts to produce disinformation about Western COVID-19 vaccines likely seek to undermine the public's confidence. COVID-19 cases will likely grow globally due to skepticism of vaccines and slowing immunizations.

Development: On 8 March, reports found that Russian intelligence agencies led a campaign focused on spreading misinformation about foreign COVID-19 vaccines. The campaign spread misinformation on New Eastern Outlook and Oriental Review journals which Moscow owns and controls. The campaign aims to mislead individuals regarding the efficacy of the vaccines, through highlighting the vaccines' side-effects and low efficiency.

Analysis: This campaign will likely discourage people from getting a COVID-19 vaccine, fearing the side-effects. Should the campaign prove successful, COVID-19 cases will probably increase globally due to the low immunity rates. With vaccine companies trying to raise the vaccine supply to vaccinate on a global scale, vaccines will likely expire before use due to the high supply and the low demand. Moscow will most likely spread more misleading information to affect countries with different interests, which could affect the economy and health industry. Moscow will almost certainly use this campaign to its advantage by promoting its own vaccines.

[Khaled Almehairbi]

POLAND: Lockdown Order Likely to Perpetuate Protests

Summary: Poland returned to lockdown during its third wave of COVID-19 infections. Anti-lockdown demonstrations will likely continue and escalate alongside community spread of the virus.

Development: On 19 March, Warsaw announced a mandatory three-week lockdown for schools and non-essential businesses after the nation surpassed 2 million cumulative cases. Anti-lockdown protests began the following day in city centers. Protests in Warsaw involving the use of stun grenades and tear gas commenced in opposition to the government mandates. In response, Berlin announced a negative COVID-19 test requirement for anyone crossing the border from Poland into Germany.

Analysis: Protests in metropolitan areas will likely continue and escalate in response to Poland's nationwide lockdown. Hospitalization and infection rates will likely increase as demonstrators continue to gather and protest. The return to virtual work and schooling may provide more Poles the chance to participate in protests, potentially allowing for the increased spread of the virus.

[Savannah Grace Riddles]

SPAIN: Hack on Unemployment Agency Will Most Likely Create Public Uneasiness

Summary: The hack on Spain's State Public Employment Service (SEPE) will most likely create uneasiness among citizens if the downed system results in delayed payments.

Development: On 9 March, a ransomware attack paralyzed the IT system on SEPE. The age of the IT system, which averaged about 30 years old, remained criticized long before the actual hack took place. The actor sent out an email containing a malicious link, which an unaware employee then pressed. This action then started the process of a botnet that made even remote workstations unusable. Employees continued the daily work on pen and paper, creating a major delay on thousands of appointments. SEPE's value grew during the recent pandemic, which left about 16% of Spain's population without a job, according to Trading Economics. The increase in the unemployment rate created a greater need for unemployment benefits.

Analysis: Uneasiness will likely increase among citizens as big portions of the population relies on the benefits that the agency provides. Due to the old age of the system, it will likely remain offline longer than a newer and more protected system would. This will almost certainly create even longer wait times for the people applying for benefits, raising tensions and unease among citizens.

[Amalie Hansen]

About GSIS

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's (ERAU) Bachelor of Science in Global Security & Intelligence Studies (GSIS) degree program at our Prescott Campus blends both academic and professional studies to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary to become future leaders in intelligence, security, and law enforcement. The program provides students with a sound foundation in the liberal arts, including international relations, foreign languages and cultures, international law, foreign policy, political and military history, and other essential topics.

About EE

Eagle Eye Intelligence (EE) is an intelligence and research organization led by the students of the GSIS program at ERAU in Prescott, Arizona.

Dr. Philip E. Jones founded EE and Embry-Riddle's GSIS program in 2002, following a career with the Central Intelligence Agency and consulting work in international development and global security. Currently, Professor Dale R. Avery, a former career intelligence analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, serves as EE's faculty advisor.

EE strives to provide actionable intelligence and analysis to its customers during the academic year. We are driven by a number of goals – continuous development, nonpartisanship, interdisciplinary studies, global awareness, and professionalism.

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Alli McIntyre, a junior in the GSIS program, currently serves as EE's Editor in Chief. For questions or comments, contact the team at editorsee@gmail.com or Professor Avery at 928.777.4708.

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