


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Aljazeera



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
HAITI: Cholera's Potential Spread Will Likely Lead to International Intervention

Summary: The recent cholera outbreak exacerbated by civil unrest will likely lead to international intervention to quell its spread and violence threatening the security of Port-au-Prince. Citizens hesitate to accept or encourage aid based on past occupation, yet an increase in confirmed cholera cases, gang violence against citizens, and a lack of resources will almost certainly require aid.

Background: On 2 October, Port-au-Prince reported two cases of cholera. Cholera remains a potentially fatal diarrheal illness that can cause the rapid loss of body fluids which leads to dehydration and shock. The disease spreads through contaminated water and food sources. The Ministry of Public Health and Population reported over 7,200 suspected cases in the month of November with 700 of those confirmed. So far, 142 deaths have occurred and over 6,300 patients are currently hospitalized in treatment centers to address the outbreak. Experts fear the disease may spread to other urban centers. In October 2010, a catastrophic earthquake struck, and international intervention immediately assisted. That year, peacekeepers unintentionally introduced cholera through a sewage leak that entered a local river that served as a primary water source for the island. Over the span of nine years, nearly 10,000 Port-au-Prince citizens have succumbed to the illness.

Socioeconomic Turmoil: Port-au-Prince's inability to compromise and conduct an election will likely further the need for international intervention to install a decisive leader who will act regarding the cholera outbreak. On 7 July 2021, foreign mercenaries assassinated President Jovenel Moïse. The assassination created a power vacuum and led to the rise of Ariel Henry as the new leader, never confirmed by the Haitian Parliament and widely considered as illegitimate. Elections continue to face delays with no push by Henry himself to conduct a democratically backed vote by the people. This crisis of legitimacy created a political gridlock in addressing rampant crime by gangs. Feuding political parties and the inability of Port-au-Prince to function as a government without support from other countries further worsens the situation. Corruption among top officials involved in drug activities also hurt the image of party leadership. Henry's economic policies worsened inflation and the price of fuel, causing total anarchy by the G-9 coalition of Port-au-Prince gangs. A humanitarian crisis soon followed when the gangs implemented a fortified blockade of the main oil terminal in the capital's port. This restricted the

functioning of basic services such as water distribution, electricity, telecommunication, and health care services. Thus, eliminating local hospitals' ability to treat patients amidst a severe outbreak of disease.



Factors relevant to Influencing Intervention: While it seems almost certain that international intervention will occur, several factors may determine when and how far it goes. The world continues to witness the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020, and most countries remain cautious of other diseases that could possibly harm both the economy and the health of citizens. The West also fears the destruction of a democracy it helped implement after its occupation of Port-au-Prince in the early 1930s. A single dictatorship in Haiti could disrupt other democratically run countries nearby. Fear of a mass migration of immigrants seeking refuge remains a primary concern of those who might intervene. With many trying to escape the brutality by any means possible, other countries face the potential of accepting increasing amounts of asylum seekers by boat.

Outlook and Implications: The cost of resources and sending troops to Port-au-Prince would most likely overwhelm a singular country who takes on the task. It remains likely an international task force will combine efforts. To avoid its spread outside of the country, cholera will likely rank as a high-priority threat should the intervention occur. To address the crisis at hand, Port-au-Prince must conduct an election. It does not seem likely one will occur soon without the aid of outside forces in eliminating gang threats to leadership and security forces. The Port remains critical to ensuring the country can function in all domains. Unless law enforcement can establish order and eliminate the threat that starvation and gang violence pose, the outbreak will continue under the current leadership. It seems much more likely another player will intervene and drive its progress.

[Madeline Orges]

[BRAZIL: Recent Election Results Likely Challenge Beijing's Foothold in South America](#)

Summary: Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, or “Lula”, will probably attempt to reinvigorate and exploit Brazil’s identity as a rising power to re-engage and lead Community of Latin American and Caribbean (CLAC) Nations to a more unified and economically independent global position. Such policies almost certainly will force Beijing to reevaluate influence strategies otherwise designed for a divided South America.

Background: On 5 September, Lula committed to accepting Bolivia as a full member of South America’s exclusive “MERCOSUR” economic bloc, pending his presidential election, according to AIDiaNews. On 31 October, Lula won the presidential election against incumbent president Jair Bolsonaro. Lula’s victory disrupts Bolsonaro and cabinet’s aggressive privatization of State-run port terminals, according to MaritimeExecutive. On 9 November, Rio de Janeiro’s Association of Port Terminals (ABTP) brought attention to rampant problems caused by privatization, likening the situation to a matter of “national sovereignty,” as the majority of Brazil’s trade occurs via ports, according to Splash247. Brazil stands as Latin America’s largest economy, according to Statista. Brazil’s reliance on exports and deepening trade partnerships with Beijing over the past ten years placed Beijing in a decisive position within Brazil’s economy and provided Beijing a privileged agent for CLAC interactions prior to Bolsonaro’s self-imposed suspension from the community in January 2020, according to The Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. Simultaneously, on 21 October, Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Santiago, sitting on the world’s largest lithium reserves, planned discussions to form a joint policy to set the global price of lithium as the “ABC” Nations, scheduled to occur during the 2022 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), according to MercoPress. Following 26 October, the ECLAC published a development strategy highlighting the importance of the industrializing lithium resources and sustainable energy production, according to the UN. On 16 August, Argentinian President Alberto Fernandez expressed ambitions in continuing to expand industrialized lithium battery production, according to CourtHouseNews. Currently, Beijing produces the most gigawatts per hour in lithium battery storage in the world, leading industry production, according to VisualCapitalist.

Lula’s Policy Intent: Lula will almost certainly attempt to detangle Brazil’s economic dependence on foreign investors such as Beijing and Western powers. Lula will likely adhere to

approaches similar to his former presidencies, wherein investment financing was diversified among competing world powers in an attempt to reduce foreign influence and corruption. Lula prioritizes the importance of grassroots movements, while recognizing the practicality of private or foreign investment to accomplish better conditions for the broader population, as seen in his own policies and those extended under the administration of former President Dilma Rousseff, according to Britannica, Oxford Research, and Brown university Library. Lula's intention to incorporate La Paz into the MERCOSUR bloc likely also indicates a desire to lead or otherwise organize surrounding nations to achieving a better economic standing,

Potential to Exploit Rising Global Lithium Need: Rio de Janeiro, the ABC nations, and the broader CLAC likely recognize the need to organize around growing demand for alternative energy sources and high-capacity lithium battery production following the 24-26 October ECLAC. Buenos Aires began domestic development of battery production in 2018, and intends to fully industrialize the process. Buenos Aires and Santiago deepened ties regarding mineral extraction practices, and Buenos Aires and La Paz cooperated in lithium production development throughout 2022, likely indicating strong commitment to each industry from all parties involved, according to CourtHouseNews. Incorporating La Paz into South America's MERCOSUR bloc places two out of three ABC nations within the influence of the Brazil-led economic group, which may allow Lula to exert influence within future lithium markets and strengthen Rio de Janeiro's relevance in the global south.

Outlook and Implications: Lula's recent presidential victory likely puts him in a position to reduce overreliance on Beijing and other foreign investment, potentially frustrating Beijing's strategies for global dominance. As South America's largest economy, Rio de Janeiro holds the potential to assist financing infrastructure projects which could fully unlock La Paz's and the ABC triangle's Lithium potential. Leading current global lithium battery production, Beijing almost certainly recognizes that the sheer volume of lithium within South America's geography poses a direct threat to their own lithium ambitions. To maintain its dominance over Lithium battery production and the lithium resource industry, Beijing will probably feel pressure to explore other strategies to fence in ABC lithium competition.

[Kyle Oswant]

[SYRIA: Ankara's Response to Istanbul Will Almost Certainly Lead to Ground Incursion](#)

Summary: Ankara assigning blame for a bombing attack in Istanbul on the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria will almost certainly lead to a ground incursion into Syria. Ankara's reaffirmation to occupy Kurdish territory may impact the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its ties with Moscow.

Background: On 20 November, Ankara launched a series of airstrikes in Northeastern Syria in response to the Istanbul bombing attack carried out by Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), an internationally recognized terrorist organization, according to *Reuters*. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made statements hinting that ground troops are mobilizing to deploy to the autonomous region in addition to the airstrikes saying, "We are continuing the air operation and will come down hard on the terrorists from land at the most convenient time for us." Ankara consistently views the PKK as an arm of The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and categorizes PKK attacks as actions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the military branch of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Erdoğan's threats to invade the region of Northeastern Syria have halted all SDF operations with NATO against the Islamic State. Moscow, a key backer of Damascus, expressed its interest in preventing the incursion through talks with Erdoğan and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi calling for de-escalation along the border region of Turkey and Syria, according to the *Associated Press*.




Figure 1: A map of Syria displaying the different governments or actors and the geographical locations controlled by each.

- **Tensions with NATO:** Erdoğan will likely use Ankara's NATO membership as a bargaining chip to avoid consequences that may come if Ankara invades territory currently occupied by SDF alongside NATO troops. Several recent actions by Ankara illustrate the possibility of it further creating tensions within NATO. On 12 July 2019, Ankara purchased S-400 Air Defense Systems from Moscow despite its participation in many NATO defense system programs. The purchase drove a wedge between Ankara and many NATO countries that view Moscow's support for Assad as unethical. On 9 October 2019, Ankara launched an offensive to seize a 20 mile "safe-zone" into areas of Northern Syria where NATO operated alongside SDF partners to capture and kill members of the Islamic State. This offensive, code named Operation Peace Spring, forced NATO countries to pull back special operations troops in proximity of Turkish artillery barrages and airstrikes. Erdoğan ordered this incursion against widespread opposition from NATO and the European Union (EU). Following this ground seizure Ankara conducted joint patrols with Moscow to occupy and search recently abandoned NATO bases. On 15 May, Helsinki and Oslo applied to become members of NATO. As of 22 November, Ankara remains the only member to have not ratified the two's membership. Erdoğan cites the countries harboring of PKK terrorists as the reason for the delayed ratification, but speculators think Moscow influenced Erdoğan, according to *CNN*.
- **Kurdish Groups:** Erdoğan's interpretation of the PKK's association with the SDF likely misplaced and could lead to perceptions of racism or genocidal ideologies. The Kurdish groups that Ankara sees as threats to their national security includes the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and The People's and Women's Protectorate (YPG and YPJ). Largely based in Turkey, the PKK, lays territorial claims to swathes of land in Southern Turkey and accuses Ankara of oppression against their culture and language. The PKK conducts insurgent terrorist attacks against Ankara and innocent lives. The official military branch of the

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, the SDF protects the Administration's efforts to achieve statehood independent from Damascus, The Islamic State, and any actor that would seek to attack the Autonomous region. The Administration expressly prohibits the SDF from conducting offensive attacks outside of the governance. The YPG and YPJ represent interchangeable military groups that comprise themselves of all men and all women respectively and remains a branch of the SDF. Many members of these groups have aligned their individual beliefs with that of the PKK and some members split their time between the two groups. The linkage between the PKK and YPG/YPJ remains undeniable based on the amount of widespread PKK support among its ranks.

- **Ankara Motives:** Erdoğan's promise to rid the region of terrorist groups during his 2022 re-election campaign combined with his distaste for the Assad regime and NATO countries' partnerships with Kurdish groups will certainly lead to more armed conflict in Syria. Ankara continues with violence because Erdoğan maintains the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria equips and supports the PKK's attacks on Ankara, and far surpassed the point of reversing the claim after spending exponential military power in Syria. Erdoğan believes he acts in the best interests of Turkish national security by conducting offensive operations to cripple Syrian Kurdish Government, according to *The Middle East Eye*. Erdoğan blames NATO member countries that trained and equipped the YPG in the early days of the Syrian Civil War and believes this set the conditions for the emboldening of the PKK against Ankara, according to *CNN*. Erdoğan wants to deny the Assad Regime territory along the Turkish border viewing the actions Damascus took against Sunni-Muslims during The Arab Spring as unethical given Turkey's large Sunni-Muslim population, according to *Al Jazeera*.

Outlook and Implications: Ankara will almost certainly conduct a ground incursion into Syria in response to the Istanbul terrorist attack. Ankara will likely accept civilian casualties as enablers of the SDF who remained in the battle area as nonuniformed support personnel. Erdoğan will likely cite his view of the association between the SDF and the PKK as the justification for the ground war that will ensue. NATO countries operating in Syria with SDF will unlikely sufficiently demonstrate to Ankara that the SDF possesses no command or control

over PKK operations in Turkey. Erdoğan will likely force the hand of NATO personnel operating in the region to pull back in preparation for the Turkish invasion. Erdoğan might have an agreement with Moscow that Ankara will take the Northeastern territory it desires, and in exchange Ankara will not push into areas controlled by Damascus, deny other Western NATO countries control in Syria, and deny Finland and Norway's NATO applications. Erdoğan will likely attempt to play NATO, Moscow, and Damascus off each other to maintain his staunch anti-Kurdish position he believes has allowed him to maintain power and eliminate all perceived threats in Syria. A ground incursion into Northeastern Syria will almost certainly destabilize the region and cause pockets of the Islamic State to go unchecked for a long period of time due to the SDF's focus on defending against Turkey. This will likely damage SDF's relationship with NATO partners and if troops do pull out in the wake of a Turkish invasion, SDF may claim abandonment. If Moscow can persuade Erdoğan to buck NATO and the EU, it will almost certainly put significant strain on the solidarity of those alliances in the form of sanctions. If Ankara encounters negative consequences from Western allies for the invasion, it would likely hang the ratification of new NATO applicants in the balance even if going against a possible deal made with Moscow.

[Tim Sharpe]

IRAQ: Government Handling of Drought will likely Increase Distrust with Nationals

Summary: The water crisis, now ravaging the entire country for a third straight year, resulted in the displacement of thousands, with a likely estimation of thousands more to follow. Due to this, numerous villages have been engaging in conflict as many scavenge for the sought-after natural resource. These conflicts stem from these villages requiring water for the crops and animals, as well as their people. As the crisis continues, trust in the government decreases among the locals. Baghdad hopes to find a solution to the worsening persistent problem.

Background: Beginning in 2007, Iraq suffered on and off droughts, mainly impacting the southern portion of the country. Requiring rainfall in October and April for proper crop growth, Baghdad called upon Ankara for aid as it controlled most of the water flow into Iraq. Starting again in 2020, an intense drought hammered southern Iraq, resulting in the stripping of the mostly farmland region's trading and economic resources. Over the next two years, the drought turned into a major crisis as rainfall levels dropped significantly. In the hopes to help the problem, Ankara and Tehran constructed dams in order to better control the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates, the main water suppliers for Iraq. However, this only furthered the problem by limiting the water into the country and forcing thousands of people to relocate.

Southern Death and Displacement: As the drought continues, many villages and land will probably suffer, resulting in the loss of generational work. When the drought began in 2020, many southern clans fought to obtain water to keep their work and families alive. The clans do not hesitate to bear arms and fight amongst themselves to dominate or gain control of the natural resource. Water tops the list of natural resources fought over by the clans, especially since the southern regions experience recurring severe droughts. This year, some 1200 families became displaced after many of the marshes and farmland dried up, killing off plants and livestock in the southern regions. Protests arose from the disdain of the government and led to the death of 13 individuals and the burning of governmental buildings. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization labeled this loss as a Disastrous Impact and the worst drought in Iraq since 1930. With many losing their land and animals, farmers are starting to look for city jobs,

leaving their old lives behind.



The ground in many fields in al-Musharah, southern Iraq, is very dry (MEE/Sebastian Castelier)
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/features/drought-dams-and-dry-rivers-iraqi-farmers-are-giving-hope>

Northern Dams and Distrust: Baghdad's attempts at fixing the crisis likely led to further confusion and skepticism from the locals. Most of these major issues previously arose in the south, but since 2021, the north is beginning to suffer as well. In the north, Baghdad is trying to solve the issue by establishing more dams, despite already having eight, with a potentially devastating one being established on the Tigris. Authorities defended the project, saying it will boost water stores and help prevent shortages. However, people living there suggest the project could impact more than 39 villages with five villages set up directly on the river. An additional 26 square miles of "fertile farmland, estates and orchards" could also disappear if the Makhoul dam reaches full capacity, and more than 61,000 livestock would require "selling or relocation," according to Liwan researcher Mehiyar Kathem. Kathem believes the dam would disrupt the everyday life of over 118,000 people. These villages contain numerous generational families,

now concerned with expulsion due to failing decision-makers. The concerned villagers do not trust their decision-makers, worried their voices would fall on deaf ears, as opposition to the dam often would. No official is visiting these villages since the decision on the dam came to fruition.



Al-Messahag is set in pasture land on the banks of the Tigris. The government hopes the Makhoul dam will be operational in five years - Sabah ARAR <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/11/drought-hit-iraq-dam-threatens-swallow-farmland>

Outlook and Implications: With the country emergency raging on, Baghdad will likely continue its modern planning. Baghdad's new president probably will work with neighboring countries to ensure water flow and programs continue being brought into the country. Continued unpopular and potentially failed programs from Baghdad could lead to further egress and decayed land. As this once fertile land becomes useless and the government interests continues, mistrust will rise and probably resulting in more protests.

[Peter Lopez]

RUSSIA: Withdrawal of Troops from Ukraine Likely Within Next Year

Summary: Moscow will likely withdraw its troops from Ukraine within the next year. Due to a lack of both external and internal support for the war effort and the inability to train and supply its forces with modern weapons and supplies, Moscow will likely continue to lose ground and eventually pull out of Ukraine.

Background: On 24 February, Moscow declared war on Ukraine. The invasion showed promising results for Russia with the capture and annexation of several Ukrainian territories. However, recent developments have led Moscow to fight an uphill battle. External and internal turmoil prevents Moscow from devoting its full attention to the war effort. Moscow struggles to supply and train its new troops due to unexpected heavy Ukrainian resistance, leaving soldiers ineffective in combat. Ukrainian forces recently forced Russian troops to withdraw from Kherson, occupied by Russian forces since the beginning of the invasion, marking a major turnaround in the war.

Minimal Support: Moscow almost certainly suffers deeply from a lack of support for the war effort from its citizens, soldiers, and other countries. Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin reinstated the draft in which Russian citizens responded with mass protests or fleeing to neighboring countries. An estimated 4 million Russian citizens fled the country from March to May, according to *MoscowTimes*. Russian police arrested over a thousand citizens protesting the war effort, according to *CBS*. The map below, created by the Russian anti-war group, OVD-INFO, shows the areas where Russian police apprehended and charged protesters with newly created anti-war laws.



The soldiers sent to Ukraine suffer from low morale, drunkenness, and occasional desertion because of significant losses on the battlefield due to a lack of proper training and necessary supplies, such as jackets and functional weaponry, according to *Newsweek*. The lack of proper training and supplies likely comes from lack of global support for Russia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries placed sanctions on Russia, drastically affecting its economy causing it to enter a recession, according to *MSN*. Sanctions also prevented Russia from receiving valuable weaponry, such as Iranian kamikaze drones that Russia used to carry out effective attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Western countries continue to send funds and new weaponry to Ukraine and aid in its defense against the Russian invasion. These funds allow Ukraine to inflict major casualties on Russian forces, causing an increase in the draft, leading to not enough time for proper training and enough functional weapons and supplies for new troops.

Technological Differences: Russia's need to consistently deploy more troops to Ukraine most likely leads to ineffective training of new forces, leaving them without the knowledge of how to operate the sophisticated weaponry provided to them. Russia recently developed a new advanced artillery system that combines the use of drones and radar systems to locate and launch artillery at a target within 10 seconds. However, new Russian recruits do not know of how to operate the machine leaving it ineffective, according to *MSN*. Ukraine relies on modern weapons given by NATO countries, most notably the HIMARS. These proved effective in destroying Russian artillery systems and disrupting their supply lines, leaving Russian troops without ammunition, water, and food, according to *Newsweek*. This allowed Ukraine to reclaim some of its territories illegally annexed by Russia. Stinger and Javelin surface-to-air missiles have also proven advantageous at destroying Russian aircraft.

Outlook and Implications: The combination of the lack of support domestically and externally, the inability to provide enough supplies due to supply line attacks, and inadequate training for new soldiers will almost certainly force Moscow to withdraw its troops within the next year. Ukraine's recent victory in reclaiming some of its regions from Russian control could mean that it has developed a successful strategy to push back Russian forces which will likely hurt Russian troop morale while simultaneously rising their own. The approaching winter will also bring harsh, freezing conditions that could inflict major damage to Russian forces. The lack of proper cold-weather clothing will most likely force the Russian armies to pull back from captured cities

to resupply, granting Ukrainian forces the opportunity to reclaim lost territories. The losses that could come from the winter may cause Russian President Vladimir Putin to consider peace deals with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in ending the war.

[Travis Feimer]

About GSIS

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's (ERAU) Bachelor of Science in Global Security & Intelligence Studies (GSIS) degree program at our Prescott Campus blends both academic and professional studies to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary to become future leaders in intelligence, security, and law enforcement. The program provides students with a sound foundation in the liberal arts, including international relations, foreign languages and cultures, international law, foreign policy, political and military history, and other essential topics.

About EE

Eagle Eye Intelligence (EE) is an intelligence and research organization led by the students of the GSIS program at ERAU in Prescott, Arizona.

Dr. Philip E. Jones founded EE and Embry-Riddle's GSIS program in 2002, following a career with the Central Intelligence Agency and consulting work in international development and global security. Currently, Professor Dale R. Avery, a former career intelligence analyst, serves as EE's faculty advisor.

EE strives to provide actionable intelligence and analysis to its customers during the academic year. We are driven by a number of goals – continuous development, nonpartisanship, interdisciplinary studies, global awareness, and professionalism.

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Savannah Gallop, a junior in the GSIS program, currently serves as EE's Editor in Chief. For questions or comments, contact the team at editorsee@gmail.com or Professor Avery at 928.777.4708. If you use material from this publication, you should attribute: Eagle Eye Intelligence Edition 420, a publication created by students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona.



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