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CHINA: Newly Emerged Submarine Likely to Deter Western Threat in South China Sea

Summary: A new submarine of unreported design emerged in China's southern waters, and Beijing probably intended it to deter the West from reaching near Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing had recently disclosed a new design, but it did not match the reported submarine. Beijing is probably seeking to threaten the West with potentially unmatched capabilities to deter aggression.

Development: On 3 February, an unreported submarine emerged near Guangzhou, China, some 489 miles from Taiwan. The submarine's design does not align with the Type 041 design the People's Liberation Army Navy recently launched. Type 041 is a nuclear-battery attack submarine, according to *Naval News*. The emergence of the unreported submarine comes days after Washington sent two nuclear-powered attack submarines to the Western Pacific Ocean, and temporarily stopped in Guam, according to *Newsweek*. Guam is approximately 1,706 miles from Taiwan. Guam currently hosts bases for the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

Analysis: Beijing likely launched its new and unreported submarine to threaten the West from moving its submarines closer to contested waters near the South China Sea. Beijing most likely deemed United States submarines as a threat that would continue to make their way from Guam to waters near Taiwan. It remains probable that Beijing is using this new design as an advantage against the West to show aggression in its waters. The new design will likely have capabilities similar to the Type 041 submarine, but Beijing will probably withhold information on it, so its adversaries struggle to counter it.

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SYRIA: Interim President Likely to Reject Preestablished International Ties

Summary: Given his recent trips and statements, Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa will likely reject strong ties with former Assad supporters in favor of other regional powers.

Development: On 2 February, Shaara met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh. On 4 February, Sharaa denounced Tehran in an interview, accusing it of destabilizing the region via its proxy forces. Also on 4 February, Sharaa visited Ankara, meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Sharaa demanded that Moscow extradite Assad and pay reparations in exchange for maintaining its military bases in Syria during a meeting between Syrian officials and a Russian delegation in Damascus on 27 January, according to *Al Jazeera*,. Neither Moscow nor the Sharaa government has officially commented on these reports.

Analysis: Sharaa will likely continue to reject strong relations with most former Assad regime supporters, instead building Syria's relations with rebel supporters. Given Turkey's proximity to Syria and high levels of involvement in the ongoing Syrian-Kurdish conflict, Sharaa's primary ally will likely be Ankara. Sharaa will likely make diplomatic overtures to Doha and Dubai in the near future and continue to foster good relations with Riyadh. Sharaa will also likely continue to express readiness for relations with the European Union and Washington but will likely place a greater emphasis on relations with regional powers. Sharaa will likely not reestablish strong relations with Moscow and Tehran but will likely maintain low-level relations, primarily due to the associated economic benefits. Sharaa will almost certainly reject military cooperation with Tehran, as well as the presence of Tehran-backed proxy groups. Sharaa would likely allow a small Russian military presence at the two pre-established bases to continue.

[Christina Muchow]

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CANADA-POLAND: Nuclear Agreement Likely Reflects Diversification Intentions

Summary: Ottawa and Warsaw's new nuclear cooperation agreement likely represents the first step in a series of efforts to diversify their economies and reduce their ties with Washington.

Development: On 28 January, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk signed the Canada-Poland Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement during Trudeau's state visit to Warsaw. According to the American Nuclear Society, the agreement calls for Canadian suppliers and technical experts to support Poland's effort to build its first nuclear reactor, with the potential to build small modular nuclear power plants later. As of 2022, Poland imported 23% of its natural gas from the United States (U.S.) and 20% of its natural gas from Russia, according to the World Nuclear Association. In 2023, trade with the US accounted for 77.1% of Canadian exports, according to the Canadian Office of the Chief Economist.

Analysis: For both governments, this deal likely serves as the first step in a prolonged series of efforts to de-risk their trade relations by reducing their proportionate trade with the U.S. Both Warsaw and Ottawa likely see Washington as a highly unstable trading partner due to the proposed tariffs against Canada. This perception likely led Warsaw to choose Canadian-controlled suppliers and technical expertise over American experts and suppliers. Warsaw likely sees nuclear power as its best alternative to its unsustainable current energy mix, which is predominantly coal-based with its non-coal energy sources heavily dependent on Moscow and Washington. Warsaw will likely continue to develop alternative energy sources and suppliers to prepare for the potential of a trade war between the U.S. or Russia jeopardizing its energy supply. Ottawa's primary concern in this agreement is likely generating new jobs to forestall the consequences of an economic recession should the U.S. and Canada implement tariffs. Ottawa will almost certainly continue to seek new markets for Canadian goods and human capital, even if Washington continues to refrain from implementing tariffs.

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About GSIS

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's (ERAU) Bachelor of Science in Global Security & Intelligence Studies (GSIS) degree program at our Prescott Campus blends both academic and professional studies to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary to become future leaders in intelligence, security, and law enforcement. The program provides students with a sound foundation in the liberal arts, including international relations, foreign languages and cultures, international law, foreign policy, political and military history, and other essential topics.

About EE

Eagle Eye Intelligence (EE) is an intelligence and research organization led by the students of the GSIS program at ERAU in Prescott, Arizona.

Dr. Philip E. Jones founded EE and Embry-Riddle's GSIS program in 2002, following a career with the Central Intelligence Agency and consulting work in international development and global security. Currently, Professor Dale R. Avery, a former career intelligence analyst, serves as EE's faculty advisor.

EE strives to provide actionable intelligence and analysis to its customers during the academic year. We are driven by a number of goals – continuous development, nonpartisanship, interdisciplinary studies, global awareness, and professionalism.

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Lauren Estrada, a Senior in the GSIS program, currently serves as EE's Editor in Chief. For questions or comments, contact the team at editorsee@gmail.com or Professor Avery at 928.777.4708. If you use material from this publication, you should attribute: Eagle Eye Intelligence Edition 464, a publication created by students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona.



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