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# Issue 474

## Of Eagle Eye Intelligence

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## **BRAZIL: Police Brutality Highly Likely to Continue Despite Countermeasures**

**Summary:** Police violence will highly likely continue, despite the Brazilian government taking preventative measures. A recent Supreme Court ruling on a landmark case on police violence in low-income neighborhoods will very likely lead the government to put new oversight policies in place. Even with new requirements, Brasilia will unlikely convict officers for crimes committed while on duty.

**Background:** On 3 April, the Brazilian Supreme Court issued a decision that reinforces federal oversight in Rio de Janeiro's public security, according to *Courthouse News Service*. This decision formed part of the Allegation of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF). The Brazilian Socialist Party (BSP) formed ADPF to reduce police lethality and human rights law enforcement violations in Rio de Janeiro, according to *MPRJ*. The recent ruling includes mandatory body cameras for non-investigative operations, public reporting of police lethality, expedited autopsies, and a requirement for ambulance presence during planned armed raids, according to *Courthouse News Service*. Although this case highlights police misconduct in Rio de Janeiro specifically, it remains prominent throughout the country. Police killings in Sao Paulo increased 55% from January through September of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023, according to *Human Rights Watch (HRC)*.

**Government Highly Likely to Enforce Stricter Oversight Policies:** The Brazilian government will highly likely enforce stricter oversight policies for state law enforcement to prevent the overuse of force. Along with the new oversights already mentioned, ADPF addresses many topics. They include banning the use of armored aerial vehicles in police operations, protecting the school communities surrounding raids, and relying on expertise and evidence to resolve homicide and forced disappearances cases, according to *MPRJ*. Brasilia will require state police officers to wear body cameras, along with the other requirements mentioned above. The recent court decision was for ADPF 635, only a part of the ADPF case. The courts made many rulings to reduce police brutality since the BSP established ADPF in 2019, according to *Agencia Brasil*.

**State Law Enforcement Highly Likely to Continue Brutality:** Even with stricter oversight policies, the precedent of brutality within state law enforcement will highly likely continue. Historically, police raids target low-income neighborhoods and do not discriminate between civilians and criminals. State law enforcement has a trend of using illegal drug activities as a

justification of lethal raids in these neighborhoods. The supreme court has recently decriminalized marijuana, making it harder for officers to use that defense, according to *HRC*.

These raids have resulted, and will likely continue to, in high suspect and civilian casualties. Rio de Janeiro police officers used helicopters to shoot criminals in densely populated residential areas during a raid in 2022, according to AP News. This event left at least 18 people dead, with only 16 of them being suspected criminals. Rio de Janeiro Governor Claudio Castro made a statement on Twitter after the event that emphasized his resolve to continue fighting crime despite push back from the public about the civilian deaths, according to AP News.

An armed raid in 2022 upset many of the residents in the area, according to AP News. As the raid continued, bystanders called for peace as police arrested many for trying to help injured civilians. The Brazilian public have begun many initiatives in Sao Paulo to reduce police lethality since 2020, resulting in a decrease in casualties. Despite these reforms, Brazilian police killed 4,565 people in 2024, many of which resulted from illegal use of force, according to BBC.



Police violence is likely to continue in low-income neighborhoods, even as civilians protest the violence as shown above. Image Source: [AP News](#)

**Government Unlikely to Convict Officers Who Commit Crimes Against Civilians:** Brasilia will unlikely prosecute or convict law enforcement officers who have committed crimes against civilians. Pereira was going to participate in a march for agrarian reform on 2 May 2000. Police caught him in a military blockade, where military police fired into the crowd and ultimately hit Pereira in the abdomen, according to *TJPR*. Along with Pereira's death, military police used tear-gas bombs, rubber bullets, batons, and firearms on the crowd of 266 people, injuring 69. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided that Brasilia holds responsible for a series of human rights violations in this case. The court ordered changes in legislation, compensation for the victims, and new training for police forces, among other things, according to *El Globo*. However, the courts did not place criminal charges for the officers that used firearms and other displays of unnecessary force. The state of Rio de Janeiro did not prosecute 90% of the non-



Public displays of power like the one seen above reinforce the trend of violence in low-income communities and make it apparent the government will likely take responsibility for their officers' actions while in uniform. Image Source: Spectrum News

confidential cases involving police lethality. They shelved most after an average of eight years of investigation without action, according to *Forum Justica*.

**Outlook and Implications:** Despite the Brazilian government enacting preventative policies, police violence will likely continue in the coming months. Due to recent court decisions, Brasilia will likely enact stricter guidelines to avoid human rights violations. These policies will very likely include more government oversight for officers' actions. State law enforcement set a precedent for using illegal drug activities to justify raids, making it probable that these lethal raids will continue despite recent changes to drug laws. Brazilian police are highly likely to

continue raiding low-income neighborhoods. The raids will almost certainly continue affecting the civilians in those neighborhoods. School closures and civilian casualties will likely continue. The residents of low-income neighborhoods will unlikely abandon their call for peace. They will likely hold public non-violent displays of protest. Despite the Brazilian public and international bodies calling for Brasilia to change its policing methods, state law enforcement will likely maintain its current operations. Even so, Brasilia will unlikely convict officers of crimes that they may have committed while on duty. The government will highly likely ignore police lethality cases without seeking justice for the victims.

[Madison Turner]

## PANAMA: Prolonged Canal Drought Will Likely Reduce Trade Flow and State Revenue

**Summary:** The prolonged drought in Panama will likely lead to long-term reductions in Canal throughput and state revenue. Declining water levels are forcing ship transit caps and cargo restrictions, driving up shipping costs. To counterbalance economic losses, Panama will probably accelerate efforts to diversify its financial and logistics sectors. Meanwhile, regional competitors like Mexico City and Cairo stand poised to absorb diverted maritime traffic. Without swift infrastructure investments, Panama's economy will likely remain vulnerable to climate volatility.

**Background:** The Panama Canal, which facilitates nearly 6% of global maritime trade, has faced unprecedented operational challenges due to an ongoing drought. With the El Niño phenomenon and climate change triggering and amplifying changes in water levels within the canal's reservoirs, they have dropped to historic lows. The Panama Canal Authority (ACP) reduced daily ship transits from 36 to 18 by early 2024, according to the *International Monetary Fund (IMF)*. This water shortage is linked to broader climatic trends, marking it as one of the most severe environmental stressors Panama City has experienced in decades, according to *The World Weather Attribution group*. These restrictions have significantly impacted shipping efficiency and raised logistical costs, with ripple effects on global trade.

The ACP has responded with temporary mitigation measures, including scheduling reductions and tiered toll structures, but shippers continue to experience backlogs and transit delays. Major shipping firms have rerouted some cargo to alternative ports or even opted for overland transport through Mexico's Tehuantepec corridor. With traffic through the canal constrained, Panama faces increasing scrutiny over its infrastructure resilience and the economic sustainability of its trade-based model.

**Canal Revenue Will Likely Decline Substantially Despite ACP Mitigation:** Panama's economic performance links tightly to the health of the canal, with canal revenue likely declining, which accounts for roughly 6% of the country's GDP. While ACP policies show about equal effectiveness in stabilizing short-term cash flow, they will unlikely be able to sustain long-term revenue without structural adaptation. The ACP has attempted to offset transit losses through higher tolls and stricter scheduling, but these measures have not matched the revenue from higher-volume passage. A 1.5% drop in Panama's 2025 GDP is directly relating to the canal throughput reduction, according to *FocusEconomics*. The decreased vessel capacity has



also led to widespread delays and rerouting, compounding Panama's fiscal pressure, according to the IMF.

Emergency infrastructure projects only serve to add fiscal pressure to the overall economy. The government has fast-tracked assessments for reservoir deepening and desalination initiatives, but both require multi-year funding commitments. International financial institutions have offered support packages, with implementation delays likely prolonging Panama's vulnerability to future drought cycles, according to the *IMF*.

**Foreign Competitors Will Almost Certainly Exploit Panama's Disruption:** Panama City's canal crisis will inadvertently almost certainly strengthen its global competitors. If these shifts become permanent, Panama risks losing its centrality in the global logistics chain—a role it has historically dominated. UNCTAD reports a notable rise in Suez Canal and Trans-Isthmus Corridor traffic, as shippers seek more predictable passage. Cairo has positioned itself as a resilient alternative despite regional instability, while Mexico City is accelerating the development of its rail-based transshipment route. Port investment also increases in Colombia and Peru, which aim to absorb displaced maritime traffic, according to *The Baker Institute*.

Beijing has also shown interest in capitalizing on this trend by investing in regional port infrastructure throughout Latin America. These investments, particularly in Ecuador and Chile, are redirecting supply chain flows away from the Panamanian route. In the medium term, such diversification of shipping networks could permanently alter Latin America's maritime landscape, diminishing the strategic leverage Panama once held, according to *The Baker Institute*.


**Panama City Will Likely Accelerate Financial and Trade Diversification:** Facing long-term environmental risk, Panama City will almost certainly move to reduce reliance on maritime revenue. As a result, climate volatility will likely remain a drag on foreign investment until clearer adaptation strategies are realized. Nevertheless, Panama's reputation as a stable logistics center has been dented, and recovery of investor confidence may depend on sustained evidence of reform and infrastructure delivery. The government is promoting Financial Technical zones and alternative logistics hubs outside the canal corridor, according to the *Ministry of Economy and Finance*. Legislators passed incentives to attract blockchain firms and digital banks, aiming



to rebrand Panama as a broader financial services hub. However, long-term infrastructure plans like reservoir expansion and desalination projects remain underfunded.

The country is seeking new trade agreements and foreign direct investment (FDI) opportunities to diversify its economic base. Negotiations with European and East Asian markets over service-based trade corridors are underway.

**Outlook and Implications:** Panama will likely face a prolonged period of fiscal strain due to climate-related canal disruptions. As throughput remains limited, canal toll revenue—a core economic pillar—will likely continue to fall short of expectations. Regional competitors will



likely capitalize on diverted trade, eroding Panama's logistical hegemony. While the government has initiated diversification measures in finance and trade, these efforts will unlikely compensate in the near term. Climate risk will likely remain a defining challenge, and without faster infrastructure investment, Panama City's economic resilience will almost certainly remain constrained into 2026 and beyond.

In the long term, Panama City's strategic and economic value within the world economy will likely rest more upon its ability to transition into a diversified service-based economy. If current

conditions persist, multilateral partnerships and funding directed towards diversified investment will likely become highly critical for stabilizing economic performance. Failure to act decisively could likely result in Panama City becoming increasingly marginalized in global supply networks.

[Gavin Packard]


## LEBANON: Upcoming Elections Likely to Influence Hezbollah's Disarmament Decision

**Summary:** Hezbollah says it will not give up arms unless the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw from Southern Lebanon. Jerusalem will likely withdraw if Hezbollah disarms south of the Litani River, thereby restoring the components of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Hezbollah will likely concede to this deal to salvage its political power ahead of Lebanon's Parliamentary elections in May 2026.

**Background:** On 18 April, Hezbollah's leader, Naim Qassem, said it would not give up arms until an IDF withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. Tel-Aviv was going to withdraw in January 2025 but has "kept troops in five places it deems strategic," according to *Naharnet*. Hezbollah gave up around 190 out of its 265 military posts south of the Litani River. The United Nations Security Council established Resolution 1701 in 2006, which only allowed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to have an armed presence South of the Litani River. Lebanon's Parliament, including Hezbollah's political bloc, voted in favor of ensuring that only the LAF could defend the country in terms of war. Lebanon's Parliament will hold elections in May 2026. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stated that the Lebanese people "no longer want war," according to *Naharnet*. Hezbollah and its political allies lost a parliamentary majority in the previous elections in 2022. Iran and the U.S. initiated talks for a new nuclear agreement, raising the possibility of Iran backing away from its regional proxies. The U.S. recently stationed 30% of its stealth bombing capabilities in Diego Garcia, a military base roughly 2,100 miles south of Iran's southern coast.

**Hezbollah Likely to Disarm for Political Strength:** From October to November 2024, Hezbollah and Israel engaged in conflict, leaving Hezbollah weakened both militarily and politically. The conflict severely diminished Hezbollah's weapons stockpile. Hezbollah had the capability of sending over 10,000 projectiles into Israel a day prior to the conflict, down to around 150 projectiles a day as of today. Israel also eliminated Hezbollah's leadership structure, leaving them weakened politically. With Hezbollah's key leadership eliminated and its military capabilities significantly reduced, the group will likely focus on regaining political strength and restoring its image among constituents before its critical parliamentary elections in May 2026. Lebanon's newly elected President and Prime Minister are seeking a way to disarm Hezbollah without causing internal conflict. The Lebanese Parliament's victorious vote on establishing all

defense capabilities solely under the LAF is another key step furthering the disarmament of Hezbollah.



**Iran's Lack of Influence Will Likely Shape Hezbollah's Future:** The fall of the Assad regime in Syria back in December of 2024 dissolved Iran's land corridor, which utilized its backed militias in Iraq, the previous Assad regime in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. As a result, Tehran no longer has effective access through its land corridor to resupply and strengthen Hezbollah. The degraded state of Iran's land corridor into Lebanon will likely remain a decision-making priority in Hezbollah's future military longevity. The struggling state of Iran's economy is a key motivation for Tehran to establish a successful nuclear deal with the U.S. 80% of Iran's population currently remains below the global poverty line, 55% are experiencing food insecurity, and its currency is at a 35% inflation rate. Tehran exported a lot of its economic resources to its proxies in the Middle East in efforts to build up a strong regional resistance against Israel and the U.S. With Tehran's geopolitical ventures in reverse and its struggling economic circumstances, Tehran will likely concede to a nuclear agreement with the U.S. which likely will include factors of backing away from its regional proxies. Iran's suffering economic situation and its severed land corridor will likely influence Hezbollah's decision about its future goals in Lebanon.


**Outlook and Implications:** If Tehran concedes to a nuclear deal with the U.S., it will likely abandon its proxies in the Middle East, leaving Hezbollah with less support, further weakening them. Due to Hezbollah's military capabilities suffering, along with Tehran's severed land corridor, Hezbollah will likely refocus its efforts on maintaining any political power it may have left in Lebanon. Hezbollah will likely view the decision to disarm itself as a political necessity to rebuild support among constituents for the May 2026 parliamentary elections. With the overwhelming parliamentary support for the disarmament of Hezbollah and making defense capabilities exclusively under the role of the LAF, Hezbollah will likely shift priorities to re-legitimize itself in the political arena. Upcoming voters in the 2026 elections are tired of conflict and likely do not want to see possible internal conflict arise regarding the disarmament of Hezbollah to the LAF. Hezbollah will likely view its disarmament as a strategic political trade-off to regain positive political influence for the elections.

[Jacob Faciana]

## IRAN: Nuclear Program Unlikely to Deploy Weapon by October Cutoff

**Summary:** Tehran's current tactic of delays and confrontational posturing when confronted on its potential nuclear weapons program aligns with past behavior under similar circumstances. However, logistical challenges, trade restrictions, and external defense buildup make the successful deployment of a nuclear weapon before October unlikely.

**Background:** On 23 February 2021, Tehran officially announced that its nuclear facilities would no longer comply with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regulations and regular monitoring, but stated it remained open to negotiations, according to the United Nations (UN) and the *British Broadcasting Corporation*. Although some UN member states refrained from enforcing punitive sanctions, the ability to apply economic restrictions remains available until 15 October, according to the UN. Since 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has increased scrutiny of Tehran's nuclear program, viewing production and resource expenditure trends as a sign of nuclear weapons development, according to the IAEA. Particularly, suspect behaviors included uranium enrichment via gas centrifuge cycling- a process that isolates a small amount of high-purity uranium, according to World Nuclear Association (WNA) and the IAEA. Between 2016 and 2019, Tehran built several more centrifuges and began enriching uranium to 20% purity, far beyond the 5% necessary for civilian nuclear applications, according to the IAEA and the *Council on Foreign Relations* (CFR).



**Past Enrichment Actions and Stance on JCPOA:** When confronted with JCPOA violations, Tehran employs an evasive stance almost certainly intended to delay and complicate regulatory

efforts. Tehran exhibited a pattern of inconsistent compliance with JCPOA program restrictions beginning in May 2019, and barred external monitoring completely in June 2022, according to the IAEA. Tehran refused to clarify program intentions, despite repeated UN information requests regarding unreported centrifuge construction and uranium enrichment to 55% past the purity necessary for civilian application, according to the IAEA. Tehran's construction of further centrifuges likely indicates a build-up of infrastructure necessary to enrich uranium to 90% weapons-grade purity. In 2007, the UN obtained information indicating Tehran secretly procured nuclear explosive designs and materials required for a nuclear explosive, including fast-acting detonators, according to the IAEA. The obtainment of nuclear ordinance technology almost certainly serves as an indicator of Tehran's desire to develop a nuclear weapon. Tehran likely reasons that if evasive efforts and infrequent communications sufficiently delay external inspections, eventual development of a nuclear weapon will provide it with sufficient leverage to negotiate new terms.

#### **Ability to Sustain Weapons-Grade Enrichment and Potential for External Support:**

Although chances are about even that allies will send support to Tehran, the present energy crisis and growing damage to civilian infrastructure make development of a deployable nuclear weapon by mid-October unlikely. As of 8 April, Tehran's energy crisis continues affecting production capabilities in both federal and civilian sectors, according to Arman-Meli. Current infrastructure failure will cause a predicted 45% increase in electricity shortfalls in the summer of 2025, with national power experiencing a deficit between 20,000 and 25,000 megawatts, according to Iranian economic analyst Hamid Hosseinzadeh. Higher uranium enrichment levels require a larger cumulative energy draw, and when employing a group of centrifuges, known as 'cascades', the power draw becomes even higher, according to the Washington Institute. Restarting centrifuges remains a costly process, according to the WNA. Tehran's power instability and increasing damage to grid infrastructure likely add challenges for the enrichment required to reach weapons-grade uranium. Additionally, a reduction in basic infrastructure will likely affect other areas of nuclear armament efforts, as power outages will likely impair missile guidance research, uranium mining operations, and resource supply chains. The potential for external assistance in Tehran's nuclear development remains a roughly even chance. In 2017, Beijing supplied missile guidance technology to Tehran, according to the Middle East Institute. On 14 March, Beijing released a public statement condemning the use of force, illegal sanctions,



and the intervention of the United Nations Security Council, while requesting Tehran continue to honor the JCPOA, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Beijing's stance in this case likely indicates that it desires reduced intervention towards Tehran's nuclear program but prioritizes international optics. This stance illustrates that direct support from Beijing remains unlikely under present circumstances, although it will likely continue to push back against economic restrictions and escalating measures. Moscow and Tehran conducted weapons deals in the past, including shipments of the S-300 missile defense system, but UN arms embargos restricted further exports, according to the Arms Control Association. The ties between Moscow and Tehran solidified during the Russo-Ukraine war, when Tehran exported over 2,000 loitering munitions drones to Moscow, according to the Atlantic Council. On 4 March, Moscow offered to mediate nuclear program tensions between Tehran and Washington, according to Reuters. Like Beijing, Moscow's investment in Tehran likely manifested as political support rather than direct contribution because of the global attention that Tehran's non-compliance has received. Additionally, the Russo-Ukraine war has likely been draining both time and resources from Moscow, resulting in indirect support for Tehran. Although Tehran gained military technology from both Moscow and Beijing in the past, international attention makes direct support unlikely.

**Future Progress and Potential for Deployment:** Even if Tehran successfully produces enough weapons-grade uranium for a warhead, successful deployment of a nuclear payload remains unlikely at present. On 11 April, Washington moved a fleet of B-2 bombers and a patriot missile battery to Diego Garcia Island, according to Stripes. Tehran responded to this action by promising to deliver a "strong blow" should an attack occur, according to *Reuters*. The military buildup in the Middle East likely complicates Tehran's potential deployment of a nuclear weapon. Without developing any new missile platforms, Tehran's missile engagement range remains limited to approximately 1,900 miles, according to data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Tehran's deployment of a missile under current tensions will almost certainly provoke counterstrikes, and Tehran's actions likely indicate an awareness of this fact. Successful warhead deployment not only depends on range but also on guidance. Although a missile from Tehran possesses a relatively low area of effect compared to more modern weapons systems, strikes further than about 600 miles potentially require an updated guidance system, according to CSIS. Israeli air defense systems intercepted most of the projectiles fired during Tehran's October 2024 missile offensive, according to the Army Recognition Group.

Tehran will likely prioritize buildup and innovation over direct attack, as a failed nuclear missile launch would almost certainly result in total disarmament of the nation.

**Outlook and Implications:** As in prior situations, Tehran's stance will likely remain one of evasion and delay. Extending negotiations over JCPOA compliance will likely work in Tehran's favor, as time spent debating becomes time invested in uranium enrichment and developing or retrofitting a suitable nuclear warhead platform. Degrading infrastructure and growing inconsistencies in the electrical grid will likely stall future innovation and enrichment efforts, and external pressures remain unlikely to cease until Tehran returns to JCPOA compliance. If Tehran successfully develops a nuclear missile with the hardware required to strike most nations in the immediate vicinity, its purpose will almost certainly serve deterrence rather than attack. A successful nuclear strike would most likely spell the destruction of the nation, and Tehran likely operates under this assumption. Instead, the nuclear weapon would likely become leverage against a potential invasion, allowing Tehran more freedom to circumvent trade sanctions and providing it with a degree of leverage in international affairs. Regardless, current conditions make it unlikely that Tehran will develop a nuclear weapon before JCPOA sanctions expire. The potential for further restrictions from other UN member states before mid-October likely restricts Tehran's ability to bluff about its nuclear potential, and absent the removal of economic restrictions, it will likely become increasingly incapable of sustaining its present development program.

[Katie Lindsey]

## ISRAEL: Internal Unrest Grows Amid Continued Gaza Offensives

**Summary:** Continued advances into Gaza are likely Prime Minister Netanyahu's bid to further ideals of right-wing leadership. Likely trying to pressure Hamas into releasing the remaining hostages, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has expanded ground offenses into Gaza and begun seizing border towns. This likely represents an attempt to undermine Netanyahu's power. Former Mossad and IDF officials signed a letter asking Jerusalem to end the offenses in Gaza and bring home hostages.

**Background:** On 4 April, the IDF began advancing farther into Gaza territory. Through a series of ground offenses and aerial bombing, the IDF took more than half of Gaza's original territory. Included in these territories is Rafah, the one border not shared with Israel, but instead Egypt. Aid previously entered Gaza through Rafah, but now that the IDF controls the border, they have placed a six week hold on allowing aid through the border. Jerusalem claims the seizing of these territories is for "security zones," according to *NPR*. On 13 April, the IDF struck one of the last remaining hospitals in the Gaza Strip. The World Health Organization (WHO) claims a medical supply shortage is imminent with the aid blockade, according to *The New York Times*. Responding to these actions, hundreds of former Mossad and IDF officials signed a letter prompting Netanyahu to end strikes on Gaza and focus on reaching the release of hostages. The letter accuses Netanyahu of not prioritizing the return of hostages above the war.

**Advances into Gaza:** The IDF's continued advances into Gaza likely represent a bid to force Hamas' hand into releasing the hostages. Seizing all of Gaza's borders effectively isolates citizens from any outside help and forces Hamas to follow demands. Jerusalem claims that all their advances are to target Hamas officials and those who helped with the 7 October 2024 attack. By attacking one of the last functioning medical facilities in Gaza, the IDF is destroying Gaza's main infrastructure. Netanyahu is likely targeting these facilities and neighborhoods to force Hamas to release the rest of the hostages while simultaneously making it harder for them to rearm and send offenses back.

**Internal Unrest:** The ongoing internal unrest among Israeli citizens likely reflects Netanyahu's future in power. With former Mossad and military officials publicly renouncing Netanyahu and his actions during the war, the opposition against Netanyahu will likely grow unless they release hostages and they reach an agreement with Hamas. Jerusalem has said that their end-goal aims to

completely disarm and eliminate Hamas, leading citizens to believe that the return of hostages is not its main goal. Accusations of Netanyahu not rescuing hostages as a front to continue the war may cause greater opposition, as an end to the war seems less likely to Israeli citizens.



**Outlook and Implications:** Not only will Jerusalem likely lose the support of more citizens, but it may also lose support from more service members and government officials. As former government officials and military members come out in opposition from Netanyahu, it will likely cause more current citizens in those roles to feel comfortable doing so. Also, the ongoing military offenses likely signal Jerusalem's growing impatience with the war and the delayed release of hostages. The IDF will probably increase efforts in Gaza to disarm and debilitate Hamas until elimination, if the remaining alive and deceased hostages are not released.

[Leah Hayslett]

## About GSIS

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's (ERAU) Bachelor of Science in Global Security & Intelligence Studies (GSIS) degree program at our Prescott Campus blends both academic and professional studies to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary to become future leaders in intelligence, security, and law enforcement. The program provides students with a sound foundation in the liberal arts, including international relations, foreign languages and cultures, international law, foreign policy, political and military history, and other essential topics

## About EE

Eagle Eye Intelligence (EE) is an intelligence and research organization led by the students of the GSIS program at ERAU in Prescott, Arizona.

Dr. Philip E. Jones founded EE and Embry-Riddle's GSIS program in 2002, following a career with the Central Intelligence Agency and consulting work in international development and global security. Currently, Professor Dale R. Avery, a former career intelligence analyst, serves as EE's faculty advisor.

EE strives to provide actionable intelligence and analysis to its customers during the academic year. We are driven by a number of goals – continuous development, nonpartisanship, interdisciplinary studies, global awareness, and professionalism.

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