06 November 2026

An Analytic Intelligence Wire Prepared by The Students of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

# Issue 507
## Of Eagle Eye Intelligence


***Authors***

Benjamin Buenafe
Serena Green
Armaan Needles
Christina Muchow




06 November 2026

# Issue 507
## Of Eagle Eye Intelligence

***In This Issue***

POLAND: Very Unlikely Chance of Russian Incursion into Northeast ..... 1

NORTH KOREA: Cluster Warhead Tests Likely Signal Deployment Plans ..... 2

MOROCCO: UN Mission's Lapse Likely to Embolden Rabat, Raise Ceasefire ..... 3
Risks

AFGHANISTAN: Opium Cultivation Location Likely Signals Relative Taliban ..... 4
Weakness

## POLAND: Very Unlikely Chance of Russian Incursion into Northeast

**Summary:** Moscow-directed armed groups are very unlikely to enter Poland's Podlaskie and Warmian–Masurian provinces through 8 November. However, Moscow's information operations and infrastructure sabotage efforts will likely target Poland due to current political instability.

**Development:** On 2 November, the Polish National Police Headquarters (KGP) announced the deployment of counter-terrorism forces alongside traditional police to the Podlaskie and Warmian–Masurian provinces that border the Russian Oblast of Kaliningrad via *RMF24*. The Polish Military Intelligence Service and other unnamed allied intelligence services determined that the risk of diversionary actions along the border, including armed border violations, remains elevated through 8 November, according to *Notes From Poland*. On 30 October, amid disputes between partisan factions in Poland, Constitutional Tribunal Justice Anna Korwin-Piotrowska suspended the right-wing President of the Tribunal Bogdan Święczkowski, according to *The Guardian*. Protests responding to the suspension have taken place since then and are ongoing, according to *Bloomberg*.

**Analysis:** The deployment of KGP forces to the border regions almost certainly aims to deter armed infiltration. KGP forces would almost certainly detect and interdict any attempted armed incursion across the border. Therefore, Moscow-directed armed groups are very unlikely to succeed in entering northeastern Poland from Kaliningrad during Warsaw's the heightened security posture. An attempted armed crossing would almost certainly prompt a Polish security response and would almost certainly increase tensions between Moscow and Warsaw. Given this, Moscow is very unlikely to exploit the ongoing Constitutional Tribunal protests through an armed border incursion but will likely attempt to add to the current political instability by sabotaging of civilian infrastructure. Additionally, Moscow will almost certainly deploy a misinformation campaign to further divide the populace of Poland.

[Benjamin Buenafe]

## NORTH KOREA: Cluster Warhead Tests Likely Signal Deployment Plans

**Summary:** Repeated cluster warhead tests and announced deployment plans likely signal North Korea's efforts to expand its conventional strike capabilities. North Korea reported testing a cluster munition warhead for tactical ballistic missiles on 1 November.

**Development:** On 1 November, North Korea announced that its defense research institutes had tested a cluster munition warhead designed for tactical ballistic missiles, according to Reuters. North Korean state media claimed the warhead could strike an area of 30 to 32 acres and announced plans to equip military units with four warhead types by the end of 2026, according to Reuters. South Korea's military detected a missile launch near Jeongju toward the East Sea or Sea of Japan, according to Stars and Stripes. North Korea conducted two earlier cluster warhead tests in 2026, according to NK News. Defense analysts identified airfields, military assembly points, and ports as potential targets, according to NK News.

**Analysis:** North Korea will likely continue testing cluster warheads and preparing them for military deployment through the end of 2026. Pyongyang probably seeks to increase the effectiveness of its existing tactical ballistic missiles against dispersed military targets. Cluster warheads could increase the threat to dispersed military facilities and personnel, potentially disrupting military operations during a future confrontation. Their use near populated areas would likely increase civilian casualties and disrupt essential infrastructure. Repeated testing and the announced deployment deadline suggest Pyongyang likely seeks to integrate specialized warheads into its existing tactical missile arsenal. However, limited independent verification of the warheads' effectiveness leaves their operational readiness uncertain.

[Serena Green]

## MOROCCO: UN Mission's Lapse Likely to Embolden Rabat, Raise Ceasefire Risks

**Summary:** Rabat will likely use the UN mission's expiration to press its autonomy plan as the sole basis for talks, while the loss of UN monitors likely raises ceasefire risks over the next six months.

**Development:** On 30 October, Moscow vetoed a US draft resolution to extend and restructure the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, which 11 Security Council members supported. A separate Russian one-year extension failed with three votes in favor and 11 abstentions. The same day, Rabat said the mission should leave within days and that it remains committed to the ceasefire, and Polisario Front representative Sidi Omar said the US draft would undermine the UN peace process, *Reuters* reported. On 31 October, the mandate expired and Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said Rabat will not expel mission staff. On 1 November, the UN began liquidating the mission, Morocco World News reported.

**Analysis:** Rabat will likely use the mission's exit to press its autonomy plan, which offers self-government under Moroccan sovereignty, as the only framework for talks, while the loss of UN monitors will likely raise ceasefire-violation risks over the next six months. Rabat's call for the mission to leave and its pledge to uphold the ceasefire suggest it sees little cost in the security vacuum and wants to avoid blame for any escalation. The Polisario Front has fought at low intensity since November 2020 and now faces no UN observers, which lowers the political cost of attacks near Moroccan-controlled areas. Alternatives include Council members reviving a smaller mission or another mediator filling the gap, which would reduce escalation risk. Confidence is moderate because ground reporting remains sparse and Moroccan outlets dominate coverage.

[Armaan Needles]

## AFGHANISTAN: Opium Cultivation Location Likely Signals Relative Taliban Weakness

**Summary:** The sharp rise in opium production in northwestern Afghanistan, outside of traditional cultivation areas, coupled with the region's relatively high levels of anti-Taliban violence since 2021, likely indicates that the Taliban's has relatively weaker control there.

**Development:** On 29 October, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released a report stating that opium cultivation in Afghanistan increased 330% compared to 2025. 75% of the cultivation occurred in the northeastern regions, according to the UNODC. Cultivation remains 75% lower than in 2021, the year before the Taliban instituted the current ban on opium production, according to *Reuters*. Prior to the ban, opium cultivation primarily occurred in southwestern Afghanistan, according to the UNODC. In the first seven months of 2026, armed anti-Taliban opposition groups increased their activities in the Herat and Badakhshan provinces, respectively located in the west and northeast, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. The Panjshir Valley in northeastern Afghanistan was the last part of the country to fall to the Taliban in 2021, and the northeastern provinces saw significantly higher anti-Taliban activity as of 2022, according to the BBC and the Critical Threats Project.

**Analysis:** The shift in opium cultivation from occurring primarily in the southeast to overwhelmingly in the northwest can likely act as an indicator of relatively reduced Taliban control in that region. Farmers in the northwest are likely defying Kabul's ban on opium production at a higher rate because the Taliban lacks a strong security presence in that region compared with its traditional strongholds in southeastern Afghanistan. Confidence in this assessment is increased by the region's relatively high levels of anti-Taliban activity since 2021, although ambiguity around the exact locations of such activity or the country's overall security situation in recent years reduces confidence in this assessment. If opium cultivation does act as a reliable indicator of relatively reduced Taliban control, then opposition insurgencies would likely first establish a foothold in the northwest if they developed enough capacity to do so.

[Christina Muchow]

## About GSIS

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's (ERAU) Bachelor of Science in Global Security & Intelligence Studies (GSIS) degree program at our Prescott Campus blends both academic and professional studies to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary to become future leaders in intelligence, security, and law enforcement. The program provides students with a sound foundation in the liberal arts, including international relations, foreign languages and cultures, international law, foreign policy, political and military history, and other essential topics.

## About EE

Eagle Eye Intelligence (EE) is an intelligence and research organization led by the students of the GSIS program at ERAU in Prescott, Arizona.

Dr. Philip E. Jones founded EE and Embry-Riddle's GSIS program in 2002, following a career with the Central Intelligence Agency and consulting work in international development and global security. Currently, Professor Dale R. Avery, a former career intelligence analyst, serves as EE's faculty advisor.

EE strives to provide actionable intelligence and analysis to its customers during the academic year. We are driven by a number of goals – continuous development, nonpartisanship, interdisciplinary studies, global awareness, and professionalism.

EE does not cite sources in the final publication; however, we log every source we use in our research and are happy to share them upon request. The official EE Source Database is available on our website's resources page for a general overview of our sourcing methods.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors, and do not represent the position Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University or the College of Business, Security, and Intelligence.

Christina Muchow, a Senior in the GSIS program, currently serves as EE's Editor in Chief. For questions or comments, contact the team at pregleye@erau.edu or Professor Avery at 928.777.4708. If you use material from this publication, you should attribute: Eagle Eye Intelligence Edition 507, a publication created by students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona.

© 2020 by Eagle Eye Intelligence. All rights reserved.

Eagle Eye Intelligence
3700 Willow Creek Rd.Prescott, AZ 86301eagleeyeintel.com