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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: Death Sentences Likely to Intensify War

Summary: Military courts' recent death sentences for soldiers accused of cowardice in clashes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will likely exacerbate the conflict and decrease military loyalty to Kinshasa, thus likely not significantly improving security.

Development: On 8 November, a military court sentenced 66 Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) soldiers to death after finding them guilty of mutiny, cowardice in the face of the enemy, and disobeying orders, according to Anadolu Agency. This follows another military court sentencing 27 FARDC soldiers to death for cowardice in October after they retreated while fighting rebels, according to *UA News*. These sentences come amid persistent fighting in the Eastern DRC, primarily between the FARDC, Islamic State affiliate Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the newly established Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a coalition of rebel groups under the leadership of former president Joseph Kaliba.

Analysis: Recent FARDC death sentences will likely decrease the FARDC's loyalty to Kinshasa and intensify the conflict in the eastern DRC. Ninety-three FARDC soldiers fighting on the front lines being sentenced to death within a month will almost certainly lead to a significant decrease in morale and command loyalty, especially among junior personnel. This will likely incentivize defections, especially given the establishment of the FRN under Kaliba's leadership. Such defections would almost certainly increase the rebel groups' capacity and perceived legitimacy within the country. Among those who remain loyal to Kinshasa, the death sentences have a roughly even chance of successfully discouraging retreat, which would almost certainly lead to increased bloodshed without substantially decreasing the rebel groups' capabilities.

[Christina Muchow]

SUDAN: Increased Drone Attacks Will Likely Prolong War

Summary: The expanded drone attacks on Sudanese infrastructure by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) will likely weaken military capabilities and prolong Sudan's ongoing conflict.

Development: On 4 November, the RSF launched drone attacks on Ed Damazin, capital of Sudan's Blue Nile region, according to *Sudan Tribune*. In recent weeks, military operations have targeted much of Sudan's power grid, causing blackouts and cutting cities off from the rest of the country, according to the Soufan Center. Drone attacks have targeted essential civilian infrastructure, causing power outages at hospitals and water and fuel shortages, according to UN News. The RSF began drone efforts back in 2024 and have intensified such operations since mid-2026, according to Critical Threats. Strikes from the RSF have frequently targeted key infrastructures and population centers to undermine the SAF's ability to govern in the war. The SAF has also increased drone attacks, focusing on heavily populated RSF areas in Sudan, according to Critical Threats. These SAF attacks have caused more fatalities in October than in previous months, because they have intensified drone attacks on commercial centers, residential areas and routes in west-central Sudan, according to Critical Threats.

Analysis: The RSF and SAF's increased drone campaigns will likely prolong the war and worsen infrastructure, economic and civilian instability in the country. Drone strikes efforts will likely force both the RSF and the SAF to split resources towards protecting their defenses and infrastructure. Splitting resources will likely limit each side in maintaining their military operations. Along with that, the continued attacks will likely make it difficult for any military activity to decrease, prolonging the war. The attacks against essential infrastructure will likely continue to decrease Sudan's efforts in keeping hospitals, water and power running. The drone attacks will almost certainly continue to raise death counts and may worsen the humanitarian conditions in Sudan. If RSF and SAF continue with the attacks, Sudan will likely have challenges rebuilding infrastructure and economy after the conflict.

[McKenzie Koliba]

RUSSIA: Attacks on Ukrainian Key Infrastructure Will Likely Increase Economic Burden

Summary: Russian attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure will likely increase the Kyiv's economic burden through service disruptions, reduced productivity, and reconstruction costs. Winter energy demand will likely further strain damaged infrastructure and prolong outages. However, Kyiv's restoration capabilities, decentralized energy investments, and Western assistance will likely limit lasting disruptions. Ultimately, Moscow's continued attacks will likely impose significant economic costs while failing to achieve decisive strategic gains.

Background: Moscow has consistently targeted Ukrainian infrastructure throughout the war. In October 2022, Moscow began a large-scale campaign of missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, targeting electrical substations, transmission networks, and power distribution facilities. These attacks caused millions of people to experience disruptions to electricity, heating, water, and communications, according to ACAPS. In June 2023, the breach of the Nova Kakhovka Dam caused extensive flooding and disrupted water supplies, agriculture, and regional infrastructure. Between March and May 2024, Moscow intensified attacks against power-generation facilities, including thermal and hydroelectric power plants, marking a shift from primarily targeting electricity distribution infrastructure to directly destroying electricity-generation capacity, according to ACLED. Moscow continues to target critical infrastructure, and repeated strikes against power plants, substations, and heating facilities have complicated restoration efforts. Meanwhile, continued attacks against digital and transportation infrastructure have further disrupted Ukrainian economic activity by targeting data centers that operate critical banking websites, and bridges that support key logistics, supply lines, and civilian transport across major rivers like the Dnipro.

Moscow's repeated attacks have left Ukraine's energy infrastructure vulnerable as the country enters another winter of war. As winter approaches, demand for electricity and heating increases, making damage to energy infrastructure particularly consequential. More than 30% of Ukrainian households rely on district heating systems, which depend on functioning energy infrastructure, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). During the winter of 2022-2023, Russian forces launched at least 13 waves of attacks against electricity infrastructure across 19 of Ukraine's 24 regions and Kyiv, damaging power-generation facilities and substations. These attacks contributed to widespread electricity, heating, and water outages, demonstrating how

sustained strikes can disrupt essential services during winter. Such disruptions extend beyond household heating and electricity access, creating additional economic pressures for Ukraine. Power shortages can force businesses and industrial facilities to reduce operations, lowering productivity and increasing reliance on costly alternative energy sources. According to the IEA, Ukrainian industrial electricity consumption fell 23% year-over-year in August 2026, partly due to Russian attacks against industrial facilities.

Economic Disruption Compounds Wartime Pressures: Russian attacks on critical infrastructure will likely compound Ukraine's wartime economic pressures by disrupting essential services, increasing operating costs, and restricting the movement of goods and people. Power outages significantly affect manufacturing, businesses, hospitals, schools, and other essential services, forcing them to rely on alternative power sources, such as generators, or reduce operating hours due to insufficient electricity. These adaptations increase operating expenses and reduce productivity, further straining the Ukrainian economy. Extensive damage to energy infrastructure and prolonged outages will likely exacerbate these economic effects by increasing the costs associated with infrastructure repair, equipment replacement, and logistical operations. These pressures may intensify during the winter, when increased heating and electricity demand will place additional strain on an already damaged energy system.

Ukrainian Resilience Likely to Limit Strategic Gains: Ukraine's growing ability to restore damaged infrastructure and distribute essential energy resources will likely limit the long-term economic effects of Russian attacks, although there is a roughly even chance that continued strikes challenge these efforts during winter. Investments in decentralized energy generation, alternative power sources, and battery storage have helped reduce reliance on vulnerable centralized facilities. According to the IEA, Kyiv added approximately 400 megawatts of distributed gas-fired generation over the past year and expanded its battery storage capacity ahead of the 2026-2027 winter. Additionally, European electricity imports and Western assistance through emergency equipment and financial support have helped maintain essential services during periods of disruption. However, continued attacks may outpace repair efforts, particularly as replacement equipment shortages and delays in connecting new generation facilities constrain restoration efforts. Consequently, although Ukraine's resilience measures will likely mitigate

some economic damage, repeated attacks will continue imposing significant reconstruction costs and challenging its energy security.

Outlook and Implications: Russia will likely continue targeting Ukraine's energy and critical infrastructure, particularly during periods of increased seasonal demand. Continued attacks throughout the 2026-27 winter could prolong electricity disruptions, increase operating expenses, and further reduce industrial productivity. The extent of these effects will depend on the severity of future attacks, Kyiv's ability to restore damaged facilities, and the availability of international assistance. Although decentralized energy generation and Western support will likely mitigate some disruptions, repeated strikes may increase reconstruction requirements and divert government resources from other economic and defense priorities. Consequently, Russia will likely sustain economic pressure on Ukraine, although its ability to translate infrastructure damage into decisive strategic gains will remain constrained by Ukrainian resilience.

[Hunter Varin]

About GSIS

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's (ERAU) Bachelor of Science in Global Security & Intelligence Studies (GSIS) degree program at our Prescott Campus blends both academic and professional studies to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary to become future leaders in intelligence, security, and law enforcement. The program provides students with a sound foundation in the liberal arts, including international relations, foreign languages and cultures, international law, foreign policy, political and military history, and other essential topics.

About EE

Eagle Eye Intelligence (EE) is an intelligence and research organization led by the students of the GSIS program at ERAU in Prescott, Arizona.

Dr. Philip E. Jones founded EE and Embry-Riddle's GSIS program in 2002, following a career with the Central Intelligence Agency and consulting work in international development and global security. Currently, Professor Dale R. Avery, a former career intelligence analyst, serves as EE's faculty advisor.

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Christina Muchow, a Senior in the GSIS program, currently serves as EE's Editor in Chief. For questions or comments, contact the team at pregleye@erau.edu or Professor Avery at 928.777.4708. If you use material from this publication, you should attribute: Eagle Eye Intelligence Edition 508, a publication created by students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona.

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