UKRAINE: Foreign Assistance Likely to Limit Effectiveness of Russian Cyberattacks
Summary: Moscow persists in its cyber campaign on Kyiv as attacks launched by hacker groups aim to cripple critical infrastructure and government networks. Kyiv’s response, bolstered by foreign assistance, will likely limit the overall effectiveness of the campaign. Kyiv will likely continue to request and receive support from certain member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to further bolster its defenses and protect NATO interests. NATO’s support will likely protect Kyiv from massive cyberattacks launched by Moscow.
Background: On 24 February, Moscow troops invaded Kyiv as cyberattacks targeted major Internet and communication networks. The day marked a major escalation in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Since 1991, Moscow served as a deterrence to Kyiv joining NATO. Moscow intensified its stance against Kyiv’s independence from the Russian sphere of influence when Kyiv ousted its Moscow-aligned President Viktor Yanukovych for the second time in 2014. Kyiv persists in its pursuit for sovereignty, in its current conflict with Moscow, with assistance from member countries of NATO. Moscow’s military integrated cyber operations in its invasion earlier this year, but NATO countries such as Britain and the United States bolstered Kyiv’s cyber defenses to improve incident response and protect the country’s critical infrastructure and networks.
Sustained Cyber Sabotage: Moscow’s aggressive cyber campaign seems a likely attempt to disrupt Kyiv’s government and military operations and weaken the country’s response to the invading forces. As Moscow forces advanced into Ukraine, hackers disabled tens of thousands of satellite modems owned by the U.S.-based telecommunication company Viasat. The cyberattack impacted critical Internet and communication networks in Kyiv and in countries throughout Europe. In May, Microsoft reported that Moscow launched 200 cyberattacks against Kyiv, 40 of them destructive, since the beginning of the year. Analysts in Kyiv attribute most of the attacks to Moscow’s military intelligence agency (GRU) and other groups aligned with the GRU. The large volume of phishing and malware attacks likely indicate the GRU’s attempt at both collecting intelligence and sabotaging Kyiv’s operations. The figure below from Kapersky provides a statistical analysis of the number and type of cyberattacks per country. In Europe, Kyiv endures the most attacks by percentage.
NATO Assistance: NATO countries most likely provide aid to Kyiv to protect their own interests and to further limit the sphere of Russian influence. In February, London approved a package worth £6.35 million to provide incident response assistance to government entities in Kyiv. With these new funds, Kyiv defended its government networks from the Industroyer2 malware deployed by a Moscow-aligned hacker group. Countries of NATO likely aid Kyiv to improve its Soviet-era defenses. NATO seems to welcome Kyiv into the alliance as a way of reducing the reach of Moscow in Europe. On 29 November, leaders of NATO doubled down on their vow to one day approve Kyiv’s membership and pledged to continue sending aid to support its defenses against Moscow. If Kyiv joins NATO, the addition of an ally that borders Moscow will likely add a strategic advantage for the alliance in its persisting resistance to the superpower in the East.
Outlook and Implications: Kyiv will likely continue to endure and effectively limit the impact of cyberattacks launched by Moscow with support from member countries of NATO. If successful in the defense of its sovereignty, Kyiv may receive legitimate recognition and permission to join NATO. If Kyiv joins the alliance, NATO will likely gain a major advantage in its campaign to limit the spread of Russian influence as its potential ally borders Moscow. No matter the outcome of the invasion, Moscow will likely persist in its opposition to Kyiv allying with powers of the western world. With that said, cyber operations for purposes of espionage and sabotage will likely remain active between the warring countries throughout the battle for Kyiv’s sovereignty. The continuation of NATO support for Kyiv’s defenses will likely limit the effectiveness of said cyberattacks launched against it by Moscow.
[Devin Sitter]
YEMEN: Worsening Humanitarian Crisis May Dissuade War
Summary: As fighting between the Ansar Allah movement and the Republic of Yemen threatens to return, the human suffering factors may act as a deterrent from an official war. Attacks on ports leaves food scarce, putting millions in a hunger-stricken state as the Ansar Allah group uses the advantage to coerce the government to look for other options aside from direct combat. In addition, the Republic of Yemen may look at the past time of peace as an example because of the reduction in deaths.
Background: Due to the seven-year conflict, the United Nations lists Yemen’s civil war as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, according to Aljazeera. Since 2014, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement’s actions to overthrow the Yemen government resulted in an estimated 233,000 civilian deaths, according to Global Conflict Tracker. On 16 September 2014, the Houthi rebels staged a coup to rise against the government and demand lower gas prices and a new system. War followed with several coalitions joining the conflict, including Saudi Arabia backing the pro-government forces and Tehran aiding the rebellion. Due to the fighting, 7.1 million people fell into an emergency state of hunger as food prices reached their highest point since 2015 in 2021, according to UNICEF. On 2 April 2022, the opposing sides conceded to a six-month truce, lessening the economic hardships. As it ended on 2 October, threats and violence resumed. Peace talks failed as the Republic of Yemen refused the Houthi’s demands. The Houthis employed drone usage to carry out attacks on critical ports in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The Republic of Yemen did not retaliate but called for international aid and global recognition of the Houthis as terrorists.
Port Attacks: The Republic of Yemen may not retaliate in fear of worsening the humanitarian crisis despite port attacks harming its primary source of income. Oil trade funds the Republic of Yemen’s budget. Destructive attacks place other ports under direct Houthi control. Loss of port control places the Republic of Yemen on the brink of bankruptcy.
Houthi rebels use drones and missiles against some reopening Yemenis ports. On 25 October, the rebels used attack drones against a commercial port in Shabwa, similar to previous attacks on other ports in Shabwa and Hadramout’s Al-Mukalla port, according to Arab News. The strikes likely acted as a display of strength to test the pro-government forces’ response, according to Arab News. The Republic of Yemen called for international recognition of the Houthis as a terrorist regime, rather than returning aggression. The insurrectionist group’s control of the ports likely gives them a slight advantage as they can cut off supplies, further pushing Yemen into an emergency state and threatening to bankrupt the government.
As the government’s money fades, it remains unable to provide public accommodations and paychecks, further hurting civilians. Inflation continues to rise steadily while the currency depreciates, stifling citizens’ ability to purchase necessities such as food and water. According to The World Bank, this year alone, “…depreciation contributed to a 20-30 percent increase in domestic food prices” in Yemen. The United Nations labeled the country as food insecure, and the continuation of the war will likely worsen the situation. As a result, the pro-government forces may focus less on fighting and more on how to get the country out of a crisis state.
Decrease in Deaths over Truce: During the ceasefire, the number of civilian casualties diminished by almost half, possibly influencing the Republic of Yemen to avoid retaliation since the truce proved beneficial. Foreign governments provided aid to Yemen, allowing the economy to recover. United Nations-assisted peace talks with the two opposing sides led to the ceasefire, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pledged to funnel money into the central bank, stimulating the economy to potentially pull the country out of the crisis. The economy continues to spiral downward since the end of the truce. While no compromise exists, the six-month truce demonstrated the people needed peace. The pro-government forces may remain in a state of compliance until both sides can make an agreement based on the evidence that the economy and civilians could recover.
Outlook and Implications: The government may abstain from war despite high tensions resulting from the humanitarian crisis. The struggling economy and past examples of peace may weigh into the Republic of Yemen’s unlikely ability to stand up to the Houthis based on the repercussions war has already taken on the country. Addressing the critical situation may take priority over the rebellion, or the mounting death toll will probably continue to rise.
[Abigail Best]
RUSSIA: Military Spending and Sanctions Will Likely Result in Economic Turmoil
Summary: Moscow will likely see great financial hardships soon due to the many economic factors of the Ukraine invasion. Moscow’s governing officials allocated a large portion of its annual budget to fund the war effort and to make up for its many military-related losses since mid-February. Multiple nations placed sanctions and embargos against Russian exports in an attempt to damage Moscow’s annual revenue and weaken its economy. If Moscow continues its military spending as export embargoes transpire, it will likely fall into an economic recession.
Background: On 24 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the 10-month-long invasion, many factors contributed to the possibility of economic distress in Moscow. Military-related expenses for the Ukraine invasion surpassed 25 percent of Moscow’s annual budget, totaling over $82 billion, according to The Hindustan Times. Furthermore, Moscow will likely see a significant change in its annual revenue as it faces many sanctions and embargoes from many foreign nations with whom it trades.
The Cost of the Ukraine Invasion: The Ukraine invasion will likely bear a substantial total financial cost. Since February, Moscow spent the $82 billion on its military effort, according to The Kyiv Post. Funding for the invasion cost Moscow roughly a quarter of its 2022 annual budget, according to The Hindustan Times. The estimated expenses come from the direct costs of the invasion and do not include any indirect expenses. The actual cost of the invasion likely evaluates much higher. As of 1 December, the indirect costs of the invasion total over 90,000 troops, 2,900 tanks, 540 aircraft and helicopters, 1,900 artillery guns, 16 naval vessels, and 5880 other military vehicles, according to The Kyiv Post. The cost to replace the damaged and destroyed military vehicles and equipment will likely amass a significant debt.
Economy Threatened by Oil Embargoes: Oil and natural gas embargos enacted by the United States, Europe, and other democratic nations likely threaten Moscow’s economy. Moscow’s economy relies heavily on its oil and natural gas exports. In 2020, Moscow generated the equivalent of $141 million in revenue from crude and refined oil exports, according to The Observatory of Economic Complexity. As of 1 October, Moscow’s current oil exports averaged approximately 9.9 million barrels per day (BPD), according to Reuters. Moscow’s October BPD was 600,000 below the quota set by The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), according to Reuters. Moscow’s BPD will probably further decrease by 1.4 million in 2023 due to the oil and gas embargoes, according to Russian Oil and Gas Technologies.
A decrease of 1.4 million BPD will set Moscow 2 million BPD behind the OPEC quota. Changes in the BPD will almost certainly affect Moscow’s annual revenue. As Moscow’s BPD decreases, its economy will likely begin to change. A limit on oil and gas exports may create economic hardships in Moscow as funding may deplete.
Outlook and Implications: The military-related expenses to support the war effort in Ukraine will likely generate significant debt within Moscow. Direct military costs used up approximately 25% percent of Moscow’s annual budget, and the indirect costs will almost certainly cause the total expenses to increase. The sanctions and embargoes against Moscow will likely change its expected annual revenue. A drastic change in its revenue flow will likely cause economic hardships in Moscow. Changes in Moscow’s annual earnings may increase production costs and lower the buying power of the Russian Ruble. Civil unrest may occur within Moscow and its surrounding areas in the event of financial distress.
[Nathaniel Pliskaner]
HAITI: Stabilization Will Likely Take Place After Surrounding Countries Intervene
Summary: Without other countries intervening, issues in Port-au-Prince will continue to grow. Corruption within the government will likely exacerbate economic, environmental, and humanitarian issues.
Background: On 7 July 2021, the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse took place. Two days before the assassination, Moïse appointed Ariel Henry as the new successor who became acting president on 20 July 2021. Henry has exceeded his term limit, decreasing government stability and control. Governmental insufficiency and corruption lead to an increase in gang control and protests. On 14 August 2021, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit the nation. Two Cholera disease outbreaks caused over 820,000 cases and over 10,000 deaths in Port-au-Prince according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). International support and aid to Port-au-Prince remain ordinary. Several countries assist in Haitian issues, and the West reportedly finishing a draft resolution for Port-au-Prince, according to CBS.
Sociopolitical Factors: Tensions surrounding political figures and presidents and corruption will likely keep Port-au-Prince unstable and give more power to gangs. Port-au-Prince holds a long history of protests surrounding government officials and presidential candidates/presidents according to Concern USA. The demand for Henry to resign continues to increase. Both citizens of Port-au-Prince and gang members protest the increases in taxes and will likely continue protesting the current sociopolitical environment. Gang members control water, food, and fuel supplies in protest of Henry taking office and the increased taxes. Sanctions for Port-au-Prince political and government figures stand as surrounding countries bring evidence that suggests these individuals played/play a role in criminal activity and violence according to United Nations Global Perspective Human Stories. This political corruption will most likely give gangs more power, and without international support or direction, it may create more distrust for citizens.
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Economic and Environmental Factors: Natural and economic crises will probably keep Port-au-Prince unstable unless surrounding counties help the Haitian government take back control from gangs and create livable conditions for citizens. Port-au-Prince continues to recover from earthquakes and natural disasters while gangs take advantage of the fragile economic state and collapsing environmental state. The Haitian government sought help from other countries after the earthquake that took out infrastructure and killed an estimated 2,200 people, according to U.S. News. This earthquake displaced over one million people, according to the CDC. Many natural disasters like this one continue to negatively impact businesses and daily life. Gangs in the area took control of fuel that helps run hospitals and businesses. The gangs’ chokehold on fuel limits hospital operability, causing more concern for humanitarian issues such as the current Cholera outbreak. With many people displaced or struggling to keep their businesses running, poverty and death rates will likely continue to increase as well as gang activity and violence throughout Port-au-Prince.
Humanitarian Factors:
The government will probably not implement necessary measures to mitigate illness and gang activity, and death will likely increase due to the humanitarian crisis in Port-au-Prince. Citizens of Port-au-Prince currently suffer the highest hunger rates in the western hemisphere according to Concern USA. Hunger rates will probably stay high due to the lack of help from the government and surrounding countries caused by gang violence. With scarce resources, gangs take advantage and hoard the resources while disease contaminates the rest. Poverty within Port-au-Prince deepens as inflection increases, and families will continue losing resources and homes. Gang violence will most definitely continue to increase. While the United Nation launched a $145.6 million humanitarian appeal regarding the cholera outbreak and hunger crisis in Port-au-Prince, many still do not receive the help needed.
Outlook and Implications: Issues Haitians face will likely continue to keep Port-au-Prince unstable unless surrounding countries intervene. Government officials and President Henry will likely hold off as long as possible from surrendering their power. Port-au-Prince will most definitely take help from surrounding countries but hold off from taking orders from them. If Port-au-Prince does receive aid and intervention from international powers, Haitian government officials and political figures will likely continue with their corrupt behaviors. Port-au-Prince will most likely respond to the United Nations (UN) resolution in particular.
[Hannah Hoffman]
ROMANIA: Political Discourse will Likely Result in Denied Entry into the Schengen Area
Summary: The Schengen Area will likely not admit Bucharest into the Schengen Area due to its corruption and illegal immigration from the Balkan Route. Bucharest does have allies it can rely on to help it turn the vote, as well as the various neutral parties outside of the Schengen Area who can vouch for its entry. To enter the Schengen Area, all current members must agree unanimously to let a country join. Due to European security and safety concerns, members like Amsterdam, Stockholm, and Vienna probably will block Bucharest’s entry into Schengen.
Background: On 24 November, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis stated that Bucharest may have its entry into the Schengen Area delayed. The Schengen Area signifies a zone where 26 European countries abolish their internal borders to promote trade and commerce. These 26 countries collaborate to reduce criminality by having a shared view on policies and police cooperation. Despite the wait, these countries still try to join the Schengen Area. The unanimous voting policy has continued to stall these countries from entering. Amsterdam, one of the founding countries, remains hesitant to add Bucharest to the Schengen Area. Amsterdam performed evaluation missions in Bucharest. Amsterdam’s evaluators have yet to publish the reports to the public. Other countries and political parties like Austria and The Sweden Democratic recently announced their disdain. Vienna’s denial from Schengen stems from its rampant illegal migration issue. Immigrants making their way through the Balkan route have burdened Vienna. The Social Democratic Party of Sweden also announced its disdain for Bucharest. The political party stated that it remains against Bucharest’s entry because of its “extensive corruption and lack of progress against organized crime.” While Bucharest has multiple countries and political parties opposing its entry, it also has many allies and neutral parties advocating for its entry. Bucharest’s current advocates for the Schengen Area include Berlin, Prague, and Paris, alongside many European interest groups like the European Union (EU), European Commission (EC), and European Parliament (EP).
Advocacy for Bucharest’s Entry: Support and advocacy from Berlin, Prague, and Paris may result in Bucharest’s odds rising for getting into the Schengen Area. To enter the Schengen Area, a country must have a unanimous vote from current members, but having allies and advocates will likely change the minds of other Schengen Area members. On 29 August, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz openly advocated for Bucharest’s entry into the Schengen Area. Scholz also states, “Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria fulfill all the technical requirements for full membership. I will work to see them become full members,” according to Reuters. Czech Deputy Prime Minister Vit Rakušan backed Sholz’s statement, which had the same goals in mind. French President Emmanuel Macron also advocated for Bucharest’s entry into the Schengen Area, stating that “France stands by Romania,” reported by Romania Insider. Bucharest also has the EU, EC, and EP backing it as Bucharest works alongside The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the betterment of Kyiv.
The Hurdles for Bucharest: Bucharest will almost certainly face barriers to quickly joining the Schengen Area with Amsterdam, Vienna, and The Sweden Democrats openly voicing political concerns. Amsterdam, the country opposed to Bucharest’s entry the longest, has openly expressed its concern with Bucharest. Amsterdam sent envoys to complete a Schengen readiness check. Without the published reports, Amsterdam expressed dissatisfaction with Bucharest’s rule of law and the reduction of corruption and organized crime. The Swedish Democrats also voiced concerns about Bucharest’s extensive corruption and lack of progress against organized crime. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte stated Bucharest must meet all the conditions, not just the technical requirements, to join the Schengen Area. The Sweden Democrats also voiced concerns about entry and exit. The Sweden Democrats most likely do not want a country that borders Ukraine. If Bucharest and Sofia’s borders opened to other Schengen Area countries, it would probably result in an influx of immigrants. The Sweden Democrats and Vienna both expressed concerns about illegal immigration and will likely refuse to allow the bid to go through.
Outlook and Implications: Vienna’s hesitancy, due to illegal immigration through the Balkan route, to let Bucharest into the Schengen Area may result in public backlash and Euroscepticism. Bucharest will almost certainly not enter the Schengen Area if they cannot appease Amsterdam, Vienna, or the Sweden Democrats. Even if Bucharest has a lot of advocates for its entry, it may not matter without a unanimous vote. Bucharest will probably continue the steps necessary to join the Schengen Area. Bucharest will have to work on its political corruption and work on minimizing illegal immigration. It may take months or even years to satisfy all requirements and appease each opposing country which may lead to frustration on both sides of the spectrum.
[Jake S. Solomovici]
CYPRUS: Heavy Athenian Influence on Lefkosía Likely to Persist
Summary: Athenian influence on Lefkosía will likely persist on the same trend over the next few years, due to the similarities between the two countries. It may extend to multiple areas beyond politics, including culture and economics. In addition, trade between Greece and Cyprus will likely continue increasing. This influence will almost certainly extend to Lefkosía’s relationships with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and, by extension, Ankara.
Background: Recent strengthening of the Cypriot-Greek relationship appears evident in the signing of two new memoranda of cooperation, in which “The leaders… discussed the joint cooperation projects in the sectors of energy, gas, electricity, tourism, transport, and agriculture, emphasizing their goals to strengthen cooperation,” according to Hellenic Shipping News. Lefkosía’s politics remain relatively recent since London persisted as a colonial influence from 1878 until 1960. London became involved when the Ottoman Empire relinquished its hold in 1878, and the British Empire stepped in to maintain the colonial status of Cyprus. The island’s status changed periodically over the years, transitioning from a British protectorate to a unilaterally annexed military occupation in 1914, and finally to a Crown colony in 1925 before being granted independence. “The agreement between Greece, Britain, Turkey, and Cyprus … finally came into effect on 1 October 1960– marking Cyprus’ Independence Day,” according to The Greek Herald. Under this constitution, the Greek Cypriots elected a president from one of their own. Athens supported the early attempts at governance from Lefkosía during the early years. They cemented the relationship in 1990, with the creation of a joint committee to “share information and coordinate policies, and thus avoid the strains that had arisen from divergent approaches to the Cyprus problem,” according to Cyprus: A Country Study. The relationship has continued to flourish in the years since, with strong cultural, political, and economic ties between the countries.
High Concentration of Greek Cypriots: Lefkosía will probably continue to notice a large influence from Athens on the country due to the heavy demographical weighting. A high concentration of Greek Cypriots account for 71.5% of the population, according to Information and Communication Technology for Health, Accessibility and Wellbeing (IC-IHAW 2022). In contrast, Turkish Cypriots account only for an estimated 9.5% of the population; the remaining 19.0% represent foreign citizens who live on the island, according to IC-IHAW 2022. This large demographic that identifies closely with Greece will probably exert a strong influence on Cypriot-Greek relations in the years to come.
Increasingly Similar Politics: Lefkosía’s politics will probably continue to align closely with those of Athens. Relations between the two began to strengthen in 1974, when the Greek military stepped down from power and consequently restored civilian government in Athens. Over the following decades the relationship continued to flourish, especially once the socialist party came to power in Athens in 1990. The two countries maintain strong relationships through embassies in each country, which date back from the 1960 founding of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC). Specific examples of this cooperation include the recent energy cooperation agreement dictating acceptable energy use in the Mediterranean, signed by both Lefkosía and Athens.
Strong Trade Relations: Lefkosía will most likely continue to experience strong influence from Athens since the two countries have such a close trade relationship and even reliance in the case of the Cypriot economy. Greece remains one of Cyprus’s biggest trade partners, with about 22 percent of Cypriot exports going to Greece. The World Banks lists Greece as the top importer of Cypriot goods and services, according to the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The amount of economic cooperation steadily increased over the last few years, persisting throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and continuing through new efforts. The official investment and trade promotion agency of the Greek State, Enterprise Greece, hosted an online seminar to explore these prospects titled “Doing Business in Cyprus – COVID 19 Challenges and Opportunities”. It highlighted areas in which to potentially increase trade, including mineral mining, medicine and pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances, and food items. “Greece’s economic and trade relationship with Cyprus is distinguished by a special bond with Greece being both the largest exporter and the largest importer in terms of goods, while also being in third place in terms of services,” according to the Enterprise Greece executive director and board member Betty Alexandropoulou. It seems likely the strong and further increasing trade relationship will lead to continued Athenian influence on Lefkosía.
Outlook and Implications: Lefkosía will almost certainly continue to incorporate a great deal of influence from Athens. The high concentration of Greek Cypriots will probably contribute to this expected continuation of good relations due to the shared identity with Greece. The close cultural similarities between the two may therefore complicate Lefkosía’s relationships with Ankara and Nicosia, which may lead to further reliance on Athens. If the similar politics of Lefkosía and Athens continue as expected, this may also further remove Lefkosía from full cooperation with Nicosia and Ankara. In addition, the strong trade relations between the two countries demonstrates that Lefkosía most likely does not need to find new trade partners in the Turkish countries. This close relationship between Lefkosía and Athens appears extremely likely to persist, especially in the areas of culture, politics, and economics. Because of this close cooperation, Lefkosía may find itself becoming slightly more alienated from its Turkish neighbors.
[Emily Tull]
