JORDAN: Abu Dhabi Investment Likely to Aid Unemployment and Curb Radicalization
Summary: Abu Dhabi signed an investment agreement with Amman to build a railway system to connect Jordan’s major mining regions to the Port of Aqaba. Jordan’s unemployment rate among college-educated individuals is extremely high, and the investment agreement will likely accommodate solutions to increase employment opportunities.
Development: On 4 September, Abu Dhabi signed an agreement with Amman to start constructing a railroad project to connect the Port of Aqaba in the south of Jordan to its major mining regions. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) estimates the investment project will take five years to construct, and it will provide Jordanians jobs in the construction, mining, logistics, railway, and other project-related industries. Jordan has a high unemployment rate of 22.3%, and over half of its unemployed have completed higher education, according to the World Bank Group. A study conducted showed that unemployment among the educated leads to greater radicalization, according to the Brookings Institute. A report from the Combating Terrorism Center in 2016 showed that in a batch of 4,600 Islamic extremist fighters throughout the Middle East, nearly all had completed forms of higher education. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is calling for young people to gather arms and start training in formed cells to prepare for military action.
Analysis: Abu Dhabi’s investment in the Jordanian economy and workforce will likely provide significant aid to the unemployment crisis in Jordan. The individuals with completed forms of higher education will likely be filling the needed workforce for the project due to the skilled nature of the positions. Jordan’s radicalization problem, especially among the youth, is rapidly growing, and the lack of jobs is likely a large catalyst for radicalization. The high number of jobs from Abu Dhabi’s investment project in Jordan will likely curb the increasing radicalization of the unemployed-educated population.
[Tucker Jones]
CHINA: Operations in Brazil Likely to Increase Presence Near Western Region
Summary: Beijing plans to send marine troops to Brazil for a joint military exercise, marking a potential deepening of strategic ties following Brasilia’s interest in joining Beijing’s infrastructure projects. Brasilia’s economic vulnerability could make it more susceptible to Chinese influence, potentially giving Beijing greater control in a region close to the West.
Development: On 5 September, articles reported that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy plans to send a marine corps detachment to Brazil for a multilateral joint exercise, Operation Formose 2024. This joint military training will mark the first time the PLA dispatches troops to Brazil for military exercises. The exercise will consist of joint landing and anti-landing combat drills, according to China Military. From an economic perspective, Brasilia’s economic freedom score is currently 53.2, classifying it as “mostly unfree,” and its economy ranks 124th in the 2024 Index of Economic Freedom, according to The Heritage Foundation. In July, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva announced that his administration is proposing to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), according to the South China Morning Post. Approximately 147 countries either expressed interest or signed agreements to join the BRI, an infrastructure investment, according to the Council of Foreign Relations.
Analysis: Beijing’s dispatching of marine troops to Brazil, just months after Silva proposed joining the BRI, marks a significant leap in strategic partnerships, likely reflecting Beijing’s possible intent to extend its political and military presence in the Western Hemisphere. Brasilia’s low economic freedom score and classification as “mostly unfree” suggests its potential vulnerability to Beijing’s political influence. If Brasilia embraces Beijing’s influence and agrees to further military operations, Beijing could leverage this to gain regional political control. Should Beijing implement more advanced strategies in Brasilia, the country’s geographical position could place the Western region vulnerable to Chinese and Brazilian operations.
[Lauren Estrada]
RUSSIA: Uncovered Malware Campaign May Signal Expansion of Cyber Operations
Summary: New information about malware campaigns in Europe linked to Moscow may indicate the expansion of cyber operation units within its military and intelligence agencies.
Development: On 5 September, an international joint advisory linked a years-long malware and network intrusion campaign to Moscow’s Unit 29155, a military unit under the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). The advisory links GRU Unit 29155 to several cyber warfare operations since 2020, including the WhisperGate malware attacks against Kyiv in January 2022, according to BleepingComputer. Historically, several physical sabotage and assassination plots across Europe, including the attempted poisoning of former GRU officer Sergei Skripal, are also linked to Unit 29155, according to WIRED. London’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released a statement saying the unit mostly consists of junior active-duty GRU officers but also enlists third-party enablers, including cybercriminals, according to SecurityWeek. The NCSC also stated that Unit 29155’s cyber operations primarily included collecting information for espionage purposes, reputational defacement of targeted companies, and the sabotage of daily operations.
Analysis: Unit 29155’s incorporation of cyber operations in addition to its physical operations likely demonstrates Moscow’s increased priority of cyber warfare when determining espionage and sabotage tactics. Unit 29155’s previous attacks indicate that it will likely target Ukrainian companies and computer systems to support Moscow’s ongoing conflict with Kyiv. Moscow will likely implement similar operations with other GRU units when considering future military operations.
[Brandon Greenaway]
IRAN: Relations with Moscow Likely to Grow Closer as War Continues
Summary: Tehran sending short-range ballistic missiles to Moscow to further the Russo-Ukrainian War will likely strengthen ties with Moscow and cause other states to lose trust in Tehran.
Development: On 6 September, Western officials reported Tehran sent several hundred short-range ballistic missiles to Moscow, which many believe will help Moscow further its efforts in the Russo-Ukrainian War, according to The New York Times. Moscow escalated their missile attacks, killing dozens of Ukrainian civilians in the past week. Tehran previously sent drones to Moscow, according to The Wall Street Journal. Western officials warned Tehran against sending additional resources to Moscow, according to Voice of America. On 8 September, Tehran confirmed sending ballistic missiles to Moscow in exchange for wheat and soybeans. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of the Islamic Consultative Council, confirmed the exchange and stated that European states send resources to Ukraine, so Tehran could send resources to its ally, according to Ukrainian News.
Analysis: Tehran and Moscow will likely begin having closer ties as the Russo-Ukrainian War continues. Moscow will likely start seeing Tehran as a closer ally and potential trading partner, due to previous and current trades. This could potentially become a recurring trade since it benefits both states. Moscow’s relationship with Tehran aids its war efforts against Kyiv and will likely want to continue growing this relationship. Tehran will likely also want this relationship to continue since Moscow can help Tehran obtain basic resources.
[Amy Bodenhamer]
ISRAEL: Israel Defense Force Unlikely to Initiate Full-Scale War in Lebanon
Summary: Despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s intentions to escalate conflict in Lebanon, the possibility of long-range missile strikes from Hezbollah and Iranian warnings most likely make full-scale conflict unacceptable risk-wise.
Development: On 9 September, Netanyahu told his army and security agencies to prepare for a change on the northern front in a weekly cabinet meeting.[1] Deputy Leader of Hezbollah Sheikh Naim Kassem stated the group would stop its attacks if Tel Aviv signs a ceasefire with Hamas.[2] Hezbollah, a close partner of Iran in Lebanon, currently possesses an estimated 20,000 missiles capable of striking at ranges up to 186 miles.[3] The Israel Defense Force recently had their 11th Reserve Brigade finish training near the northern border, a few months after the 55th Reserve Paratroopers Brigade and 12th Brigade finished theirs.[4],[5] On 29 June, Iran’s United Nations mission warned Tel Aviv that “full-scale military aggression” into Lebanon would lead to the full involvement of all Iranian-aligned terror groups in the region.[6] Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz responded to the warning by stating that Iran “deserves to be destroyed” on social media.[7]
Analysis: Tel Aviv will most likely not escalate its conflict with Hezbollah into full-blown war due to the potential for Hezbollah to strike deep into Israeli territory and the risk of Iranian retaliation. If a conflict emerges, Hezbollah will most likely launch its conserved long-range missile into Israeli territory. Hezbollah missiles will almost certainly create political backlash from an invasion into Lebanon, impacting the morale of the military and the larger war effort. The involvement of additional armed groups by Iran in the conflict will most likely either reinforce the current war fronts in Gaza and the northern border or create new fronts somewhere along the Israeli border. The possibility of new fronts forming may make a military campaign in Lebanon too risky for Tel Aviv to accept.
[Sebastien Bragg]
[1] https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5059019-israel-threatenss
[2] https://apnews.com/article/hezbollah-israel-hamas-lebanon-gaza-b75185ba722bf31c4982e579541a12f0
[3] https://www.csis.org/analysis/coming-conflict-hezbollah
[4] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/09/hezbollah-continues-attacks-as-idf-brigade-drills.php
[5] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-moves-troops-near-lebanon-border-amid-military-1
[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/29/iran-warns-israel-of-obliterating-war-if-it-attacks-lebanon
[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-fm-iran-regime-threatening-destruction-deserves29/
FRANCE: Russian Drone Incursions in Neutral States Likely to Alter Weapons Policy
Summary: On 7 and 8 September, two European Union (EU) member states reported Russian drone incursions. Combined with increasing diplomatic pressure, this will likely lead Paris to lift weapons restrictions on Kyiv.
Development: On 8 September, a Russian drone crashed in Romanian territory during a Russian attack on western Ukraine. Drone fragments entered Romania on several previous occasions. On 7 September, a Russian drone crashed in Latvian territory after entering Latvian airspace bordering Belarus. General Maciej Klisz, head of the Polish army’s operational command, noted that such violations previously occurred in Poland. He believes they will likely re-occur, according to Reuters. In August, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell urged EU members to lift all weapons use restrictions during a meeting with the bloc’s foreign ministers. Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen and Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna urged the same during a joint press conference. Paris currently allows the Ukrainian military to use their weapons to attack missile launch points within Russia but no other military targets.
Analysis: Given the increasing threat posed to EU members’ territorial integrity, as well as diplomatic pressure, Paris will likely partially lift its weapons restrictions, allowing Kyiv to escalate its offensive. Paris’s willingness to allow some strikes within the Russian territory indicates a likely willingness to lift these restrictions. Kyiv’s recent battlefield successes and Moscow’s lack of response to previous removals of weapons restrictions will likely further galvanize this willingness. Paris will likely cite these recent incursions to justify partially removing restrictions. Paris will likely allow Kyiv to strike all military targets within Russia, although they will almost certainly continue to prohibit strikes against civilian targets. Diplomatic pressures from other EU states and top EU officials will likely accelerate this policy change.
[Christina Muchow]
