MALI: Ethnic Tensions and Cross-border Violence Likely to Increase Conflict
Summary: Heightened ethnic tensions, issues maintaining international military support, and porous borders with the neighboring Sahel and North African countries will likely exacerbate the conflict between the Malian government and various jihadist groups in the North.
Stalemate in Mali: Jihadist groups hold large amounts of territory in the country’s north, while the Bamako government and international allies control the southern region. The extremist groups include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar al-Dine (AAD), and Boko Haram. AQIM remains active across the Sahel and North Africa, while AAD and MUJAO operate exclusively in Mali. Boko Haram resides predominantly in Nigeria but exploits the porous border with Mali to carry out attacks.
Ethnic Tensions: Bamako likely lost the support and confidence of its population following sustained hostility between ethnic groups. The extremist organizations primarily target soldiers and military bases, dampening soldier morale and leading to desertion or defectors. The 200,000 displaced civilians turned to armed militias to protect them from extremists and rivals, demonstrating a lack of confidence in Bamako. Extremists continue exploiting fear and instability in Mali to recruit and forge alliances with militias.
International Support: The United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) may eventually overwhelm militias with numbers and equipment, but the comparatively heavy losses threaten foreign support. MINUSMA deployed over 15,000 personnel into the region since 2013 to stabilize and aid civilians and remains the most hazardous of the UN’s peacekeeping missions. Canada and other UN members opted to withdraw their presence due to the high risk of fatalities. A majority of those deployed in MINUSMA come from other African Union (AU) members, including Chad, Burkina Faso, and Egypt. If Bamako convinces Western countries to increase contributions, it may reduce the length of the mission, but, as the UN stands strictly as a peacekeeper, Bamako may turn to other avenues. Bamako will likely ask for more support from the AU, which may in turn attempt to further involve other international organizations like NATO that can take a more militaristic approach than the UN.
Border Security: Mali’s borders with neighboring countries, including Algeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso remain susceptible to jihadist cross-border attacks. In November 2019, jihadists attacked across the Nigerien border, killing 53 Malian soldiers and civilians and on 17 February, militants killed 24 people in Burkina Faso near the Malian border. Bamako will likely try to tighten control over Mali’s border regions to stem the trans-border operations of various jihadist organizations. The country’s porous borders with neighboring Sahel countries facilitate easy access for foreign jihadist fighters to enter the conflict. Illegal smuggling operations and conflict over access to limited natural resources also continue to fuel conflict along Mali’s borders.
Outlook and Implications: Division among the Malian people will almost certainly disrupt peacekeeping operations, aggravated by ethnic tensions and militant group operations. As ethnic conflicts in the region continue and claims circulate that Bamako funded attacks, Malians will likely lose faith in Bamako’s ability to combat sub-state violence. Some of the more ambitious militias in Mali will likely exploit fear and border insecurity to gain widespread political and military support, leading to competition over recruits and resources. If Bamako does not effectively mitigate competition between sub-state groups, it may lose a significant portion of its power to the militias and given the unstable nature of the parliament since mid-2019, militias may succeed in overturning the government.
Furthermore, international aid will almost certainly become vital in preventing destabilization. Global military, logistics, and humanitarian support will likely stabilize Mali in the short term but may exacerbate problems in the long run. If Bamako does not adequately prepare, or if those aiding do not adequately bolster the government’s capabilities, it will most likely fail to maintain peace once international forces withdraw.
Though Mali remains in a stalemate, the circumstances favor extremist groups. Bamako will need to eradicate extremist sentiment in the North by quelling militias and preventing ethnicity motivated attacks to overcome sub-state violence in contrast with extremist groups that only need to survive. The preservation of membership of an extremist group will almost certainly enable the regrouping and rebuilding in opposition to Bamako. Additionally, groups like AQIM with ties to parent organizations will likely call on its affiliates for recruitment, logistic, and material support. Mali will almost certainly remain unstable and susceptible to sub-state violence despite international humanitarian aid.
[Max Olson and Kaylee Coffman]
AFGHANISTAN: Ghani’s Reelection Will Likely Threaten the Taliban Peace Process
Summary: The contentious reelection of President Ashraf Ghani will likely exacerbate domestic political unrest and may threaten the sustainability of peace talks with the Afghan Taliban.
Development: On 16 February, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) confirmed President Ashraf Ghani’s second term in office, concluding the five-month delay since the 28 September election. The election remained undecided while the IEC recounted and audited the results. Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s competitor, alleged fraud against the election commission and declared intentions to form a parallel government. The IEC released the results shortly after NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg declared a potential reduction in military presence if the Afghan Taliban sustain peace talks.
Analysis: Ghani’s reelection for another five years will likely exacerbate domestic political turmoil and threaten the progress of peace talks with the Afghan Taliban. Abdullah’s ability to construct a parallel government in opposition to Ghani remains in question, but significant support of Abdullah and threats to provoke insurgency will likely reduce Kabul’s political mobility. Ghani’s attempts to continue peace talks with the Taliban, reduce domestic violence, and establish a NATO withdrawal plan may fail as domestic unrest develops.
[Riley Coder]
IRAN: Election Campaign Disqualifications Will Likely Increase Civil Unrest
Summary: The Guardians’ Council cleared a record low percentage of candidates, with disqualifications mostly targeting moderate and reformist candidates and sitting members of parliament. The mass disqualifications will likely spark further civil unrest in an already fragile government-population relationship.
Development: On 13 February, Iranian parliamentary candidates began their election campaigns amid mass disqualification of mostly reformist and moderate candidates. The mass disqualifications, issued by Iran’s Guardians’ Council, sparked anger among the population with many saying they will refrain from voting despite Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s calls for participation. The Guardians’ Council gave little reason for the disqualifications, often citing the candidate’s disloyalty to Islam. The Guardians’ council also barred some sitting parliamentary members from running for reelection. President Rouhani objected to the disqualifications but urged participation in the polls.
Analysis: The mass disqualifications by the Guardians’ Council will likely further polarize the people and the government and may lead to a future shift of political power in Iran. The 21 February legislative elections will likely produce a heavily conservative parliament in contrast to President Rouhani, a reformist. This divide will likely further polarize governmental bodies and continue to frustrate the population of Tehran. The growing distrust of the government in recent weeks coupled with a seemingly illegitimate election process may send Tehran into a period of civil unrest, sustaining anti-government protests and spurring adverse international attention.
[Timothy Fergus]
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Suspended Municipal Election Likely to Cause Uncertainty
Summary: The suspension of municipal elections across the country due to electronic voting malfunctions will likely lead to political uncertainty and calls for improved voting protocols.
Development: On 16 February, the Dominican Republic suspended municipal elections nationwide four hours after voting commenced due to issues with the electronic voting system. The Central Electoral Board reported that half of the electronic devices used failed to load the virtual ballots. Electoral officials announced that they began investigating the cause of the malfunction, and rescheduled municipal elections to 15 March ahead of the general election on 17 May.
Analysis: As officials did not initially announce a re-polling date while halting all elections nationwide, many Dominicans will likely call for stricter election protocols to avoid malfunctions in the future. Additionally, voters may insist on manual voting rather than electronic ballots. Delayed municipal elections may also affect the Dominican general elections occurring in May, causing the Dominican Republic to enter into a period of political limbo. Political uncertainty may also negatively impact the Dominican Republic’s economy as it may project an image abroad of political instability and unreliability.
[Gianna Geiger]
PAKISTAN: Continued Violence May Threaten Future Chinese Development Projects
Summary: A suicide bombing in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province demonstrates continued sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia that may postpone future One Belt One Road projects in the area.
Development: On 17 February, a suicide bombing near an Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammat (ASWJ) rally killed 7 and injured 25 in Quetta, Pakistan. ASWJ is a far-right Sunni Muslim political party allegedly linked to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant group that targets Shia Muslims in Pakistan. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, rival Sunni and Shiite militants and low-level insurgencies staged similar attacks, including an attack on a Mosque which killed 13 Shiites in January. The ASWJ wants Pakistan to declare all Shia Muslims, who make up 20% of the population “non-Muslims.” The Baluchistan province remains key to the China’s Pakistani Economic Corridor, part of the One Belt One Road Initiative.
Analysis: Growing tensions between Sunni and Shia groups may exacerbate sectarian violence in Pakistan, undermining counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and reducing confidence in Islamabad’s capabilities. The suicide bombing exemplifies the continued violence toward Shiites in Pakistan, calling into question the security of Chinese projects for the One Belt One Road Initiative, such as the planned energy link from western China to Pakistan’s southern port of Gwadar. If attacks like these continue, China may postpone future projects in the Baluchistan province until Pakistan quells the insurgencies and militant groups.
[Grace Knopp]
IRELAND: Sinn Fein’s Victory Demonstrates Developing Nationalist Sentiment
Summary: Sinn Fein gained seats in Ireland’s parliament, creating a deadlocked government and demonstrating growing unrest and the further decline in the United Kingdom’s (UK) unity.
Development: On 8 February, Sinn Fein won a landslide victory in Ireland, carrying 24.5% of the first-choice popular vote and almost doubling its total share from the 2016 election. Sinn Fein had well-known connections to the Provisional Irish Republican Army, a terrorist group that fought for a United Ireland. This unprecedented victory for Sinn Fein created a contentious parliament with no party or coalition close to an 80-seat majority.
Analysis: Sinn Fein’s victory in Ireland demonstrates a growing nationalist sentiment and growing support for Irish independence from the UK. Sinn Fein’s victory will likely lead to an increased push for the unification of Ireland as well as a revitalized conflict between Catholic and Protestant factions in the north that may turn violent. If the deterioration of relations between the UK’s nations continues, movements for independence will likely develop and may turn violent. Although the unification of Ireland remains unlikely, Sinn Fein’s victory indicates unrest from the Irish people.
[Ethan Theobald]
